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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining for public employees became a reality in 1974 
with the passage of Senate File 531 by the Sixty-fifth General Assembly 
of the state of Iowa. Governor Robert D. Ray signed the bill into law, 
April 23, 1974. Public school employees who negotiated during the 
initial year worked within the guidelines of a master agreement after 
July 1, 1975. Chapter 20, "Public Employment Relations," of the Code of 
Iowa states the purpose of collective bargaining in Section 1. 
The general assembly declared that it is the public policy 
of the state to promote harmonious and cooperative relation­
ships between government and its employees by permitting public 
employees to organize and bargain collectively; to protect the 
citizens of this state by assuring effective and orderly opera­
tions of government in providing for their health, safety, and 
welfare; to prohibit and prevent all strikes by public employees; 
and to protect the rights to public employees to join or refuse 
to join, and to participate in or refuse to participate in em­
ployee organizations. (59, p. 41) 
The Public Employment Relations Act was met with enthusiasm by em­
ployees in 1974, while employers greeted the new law with a certain de­
gree of skepticism. Both employees and employers had definitive expecta­
tions relative to the outcomes of collective bargaining. A study (23) 
completed at Iowa State University in 1977 by Harlan Else surveyed 
twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents, and three hun­
dred teachers frcsn Iwa 's twenty-five largest districts based on student 
enrollment and twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents, 
and three hundred teachers from Iowa's twenty-five smallest student en­
rollment school districts. Else's study focused on Iowa teachers, super­
intendents, and board members' expected outcomes of the Iowa Public 
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Employment Relations Act (23). 
Notable among the findings in Else's study were: 
1. Teachers were generally more optimistic about the long-
range expected outcomes of collective bargaining than were board 
members and superintendents. 
2. Teachers with fewer years of experience were generally 
more optimistic concerning outcomes of teacher negotiations than 
were more experienced teachers. 
3. Teachers from bargaining districts were generally more 
optimistic about the effects of public employee collective bar­
gaining than were teachers from districts that did not bargain. 
4. There was a less optimistic attitude toward teacher 
collective bargaining by teachers from small school districts. 
5. Small school districts' superintendents indicated to a 
lesser extent than large school superintendents that collective 
bargaining would adversely affect classroom instruction; that 
teachers would have less input into school district decisions; 
and that all groups will become more deeply involved politically. 
6. Superintendents from bargaining districts were generally 
less optimistic about the long-range effects of collective bar­
gaining than were their colleagues from non-bargaining districts. 
7 - Board members from large school districts believed more 
strongly that collective bargaining was not going to result in 
positive effects for teachers or education over a period of years. 
It has been five years since the completion of Else's study and 
seven years since enactment of the Public Employment Relations law. Few 
changes have been made in Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa during this 
time. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) (cited in 4) identi­
fies two specific changes. First, the voting requirement for bargaining 
representation has been changed frcm a majority of those eligible to vote 
to a majority of those voting, for passage. Second, the first two bar­
gaining sessions each year have been opened to the public. 
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Iowa State Education Association representatives and Ted Davidson, 
Executive Secretary of the Iowa Association of School Boards, indicated, 
based upon their observations to date, that the changes have had little 
or no effect on the outcomes of collective bargaining. 
Any changes in the perceptions of board members, superintendents, 
and teachers relative to collective bargaining outcomes can be attributed 
to the actual impact of the bargaining phenomenon (or process) rather 
than any changes in the law. 
In his 1977 study, Else concluded. 
The findings of this investigation indicate that teachers 
generally believe that collective bargaining will be beneficial 
to themselves and to public education in general. Superintendents 
and board members conversely believe that teacher collective bar­
gaining will be generally detrimental to education. All three 
groups have formulated these opinions on the basis of limited 
knowledge and very little direct experience. Their expectations 
are based on what they "think" will happen. Teacher collective 
bargaining, at this early stage, may be a "Fairy Godmother" or a 
"Boogey Man" depending upon individual perceptions affected more 
by job role than by factual data. (23, p. 90) 
One recent study conducted by Albert Wood at the University of Iowa, 
in 1980, analyzed the realities of collective bargaining by comparing 
salaries, fringe benefits and personnel policies in Iowa schools with and 
without collective bargaining agreements. Wood found the gains made by 
teachers in fringe benefits, personnel practices, and in 8 of 10 salary 
measures were not significantly different between bargaining and nonbar-
gaining districts in the first four years of negotiations (69). 
It was felt that the collection and analysis of the instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining based on the fac­
tual data educators in Iowa now have available would provide further 
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insight into the bargaining process and be useful to educators- This 
study analyzed the effects of teacher collective bargaining after the 
first seven years. Comparisons were made between what teachers, superin­
tendents, and board members thought would be the outcomes of collective 
bargaining and what they now have experienced and observed. 
The Problem 
It was the intent of this study to report what could be found in 
authoritative literature and through a research project as to whether or 
not there was a significant difference in the actual instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 
between and among groups of randomly selected elementary teachers, secon­
dary teachers, superintendents, and board members. In addition, an 
attempt was made to compare the realities of collective bargaining in 
Iowa with the expected outcomes of bargaining as concluded in the Else 
study completed in 1977. 
It was posited that the seven years since Implementation of public 
employee bargaining in Iowa was ample time for teachers, superintendents, 
and board members to assess the outcomes of public school teacher col­
lective bargaining. A determination of the degree of satisfaction, if 
any, with the bargaining process was sought. 
Related research completed in Iowa suggested that salary, fringe 
benefits, personnel policies, job security and teacher/administrator re­
lations have not been clearly strengthened through collective bargain­
ing (36, 69). 
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It was anticipated that further study of the instructional and non-
instructional outccmes of collective bargaining in Iowa would provide a 
more conclusive picture of the actual effects of public employee collec­
tive bargaining on education in Iowa. 
Need for the Study 
The expectations of teachers, superintendents, and board members 
relative to public employee collective bargaining differed significantly 
when the Public Employment Relations Act was enacted in 1974. Generally, 
teachers were optimistic about the instructional and noninstructional 
outcones of the negotiations process. Conversely, administrators, and 
board members were pessimistic as they anticipated the effects of bargain­
ing on the education of children and public education as a whole. 
Without a doubt, teacher collective bargaining has had an impact on 
the instructional and noninstructional facets of public education in 
the first seven years under the law. Determining the extent of that 
impact as well as the benefit or detriment of collective bargaining to 
education may provide insight for new direction in the bargaining process. 
Definition of Terms 
1. Actual Outcomes--used in this study to identify the positive 
and/or negative aspects which the participants in the study perceive to 
be the realities of teacher collective bargaining. The actual outcomes 
analyzed in this study can be classified into two general categories— 
instructional and noninstructional. 
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Participants' perceptions in this study are stressed because lit­
erature indicates a close relationship between perceptions and reality. 
Murphy (47) notes that what we perceive is real to us. Haire states: 
An individual's reaction to any situation is always a 
function not of the absolute character of the interaction, 
but of his perceptions of it. It is how he sees things 
that counts. (30, p. 191) 
Mendelssohn defines reality as: 
. . . what is felt and believed. (Cited in 8, p. 480) 
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines reality as being: 
. . . the quality or state of being real. (66, p. 1254) 
For the purpose of this study, what a participant perceives is real 
to him/her. Therefore, if participants perceive it, it is true and it 
is real. 
2. Collective Bargaining--Young defines collective bargaining as: 
. . .  a  p r o c e s s  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  f o r m a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between management and employees. (72, p. 126) 
Shea says : 
The purpose of collective bargaining is to improve wages, 
hours, and working conditions of workers represented by 
a union in a defined bargaining unit. (Cited in 72, p. 125) 
The Iowa Association of School Boards Employee Relations Guide de­
fines collective bargaining as: 
Negotiations between an employee organization and a public 
cisplcyer on contract proposals and vhich may result in a 
labor agreement between them. (24, p. 26) 
Collective bargaining is used in this study to identify the process 
by which teachers of a school district, through selected representatives, 
can negotiate their conditions of employment with the board of education 
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or its representative(s). 
For the purposes of this study, the terms "collective negotiations" 
and "professional negotiations" will be considered synonymous with col­
lective bargaining (23). 
3. Collective Bargaining Agreement--is used in this study to 
identify the agreement reached between the board of education and the 
teacher association which contains the wages, hours and working condi­
tions agreed upon in collective bargaining. Normally, the agreement is 
in writing (master contract) and is in effect for a specified period. 
4. Employee Organization—used in this study to mean an organiza­
tion of any kind in which public employees participate and which exists 
for the primary purpose of representing public employees in their employ­
ment relations. 
5. Final Offer Binding Arbitration—The California School Board 
Association's Personnel Task Force defines binding arbitration as: 
. . . the final step of the negotiating process whereby 
a neutral third party defines the contract settlement when 
negotiations do not produce a settlement. (33, p. 31) 
"Arbitration," as used in this study, involves the resolution of disputes 
or controversies, considered impasses, by a third party over what shall 
constitute the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (24) . For the 
purpose of this study, the term "interest arbitration" will be considered 
synonymous with "arbitration." 
"Final offer" means a party's last or final position on each impasse 
item. A party's final offer is proposed after impasse has been reached 
and prior to submission to arbitration. 
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Pursuant to P,E.R.A. Section 22, participation in final and bind­
ing arbitration with respect to impasses in negotiations is mandatory 
upon request of either party unless other impasse procedures have previ­
ously been agreed upon (24). 
Combining the segments of final offer binding arbitration, it can 
be defined as the resolution, which becomes compulsory, by a third party, 
in disputes over what shall constitute the terms of a collective bargain­
ing agreement based on each party's final position prior to arbitration. 
6. Instructional Outcomes--used in the Else study and replicated 
in this study to identify: 
. . . issues which contain provisions covering working 
conditions which directly influence classroom practices 
(e.g., class size, maximum teaching hours, use of aides, 
school calendar, textbook and curriculum review, teacher 
qualifications and evaluation, student discipline policies, 
the principal's role as the instructional leader of the 
school, and parent participation). (23, p. 5) 
7. Noninstructiona1 Outcomes--used in the Else study and replicated 
in this study to identify: 
. . . issues which contain provisions covering salary and 
fringe benefit issues and the relationship between and among 
the principle parties in the collective bargaining process 
(e.g., teacher-principal relationships, teacher-board rela­
tionships, teacher-public relationships, grievance procedures, 
final binding arbitration, and job satisfaction for teachers, 
board members, and superintendents). (23, p. 5) 
8. Teacher Strike--used in this study to mean a public school 
teacher's refusal in coordinated effort with others to report to work, 
or willful absence from work or stoppage of work, or abstinence in whole 
or part from full, faithful, and proper performance of the duties of a 
public school teacher for the purpose of inducing, influencing, or 
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coercing a change in the conditions, compensation, rights, privileges, 
or obligations of public employment (24). 
9. Terms of Employment--used in this study to identify the obliga­
tions, within the scope of negotiations upon which the teachers' asso­
ciation and employing public school district have agreed. The scope of 
negotiations for teachers includes wages, hours, vacations, insurance, 
holidays, leaves of absence, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, 
seniority, transfer procedures, job classification, health and safety 
matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reductions, and in-
service training. Additional matters may be negotiated if mutually 
agreed upon but are not mandatory in Iowa at this time. Common permis­
sive items include teacher preparation time, class size, association 
rights, the teacher's role in curriculum development, policymaking, and 
evaluation criteria. 
Hypotheses 
The major focus of this study centered upon analysis and comparison 
of perceptions of teachers, superintendents, and board members regarding 
the realities of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa. To provide 
direction and structure for this study, the following nine hypotheses 
were formulated: 
1. There will be no significant differences in observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act (PERA) between the groups of Iowa ele­
mentary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and 
board members. 
2. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
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instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act (PERA) among groups of Iowa teachers, 
superintendents, and board members in twenty-five large student 
enrollment school districts as compared to those from twenty-
five small student enrollment districts. 
3. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary 
teachers relative to their differences in number of years of 
teaching experience. 
4. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary 
teachers relative to whether they are male or female, 
5. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers relative to whether 
the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary 
or secondary source of family income. 
6. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and 
board members in the study relative to whether or not the school 
district of which they are a part has a formal bargaining unit. 
7. There will be no significant differences in the observed 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act among superintendents in the study rela­
tive to their differences in total years of experience as a school 
superintendent. 
8. There will be no differences between the expected in­
structional and noninstructional outcomes expressed in 1977 and 
the actual, observed instructional and noninstructional outcomes 
of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between the groups of 
Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, 
and board members. 
9. There will be no significant differences in the degree 
of satisfaction with final offer binding arbitration as an impasse 
procedure in the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act as an alter­
native to strike between the groups of Iowa elementary teachers, 
secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
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Delimitations 
This study was limited to a random sample of the groups being sur­
veyed, including Iowa public school elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members. The investigation dealt 
with a sample of teachers, superintendents, and board members from only 
twenty-five large and twenty-five small student enrollment school dis­
tricts in Iowa who had collective bargaining units and twenty-five 
selected districts in Iowa which did not have certified collective bar­
gaining units at the time of the study. 
It was assumed that all teachers, superintendents, and board members 
were knowledgeable in the area of collective bargaining and were aware 
that the Iowa Public Employment Relations Law had been in effect since 
July 1, 1975. Also, it was assumed that all groups had observed the 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa and could respond to 
the perceived outcomes of such bargaining. However, no attempt was made 
to determine respondents' experiences with collective bargaining if the 
respondent was from a bargaining district. When analyzing the percep­
tions of respondents currently employed in noribargaining districts, this 
investigation dealt only with those respondents who had zero to two years 
experience in a bargaining unit. 
Because collective bargaining csn be highly emotional, a specific 
perception on a survey of the type used in this study may be the result 
of a recent situation in the participants' experience which may have 
affected the respondents' expressed observation at the time of completing 
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the survey but may not be a long-term belief. Therefore, since the ob­
servations of respondents at any point in time after completion of this 
study may be altered by additional experience of the respondents, the 
observed outcomes data collected in this study is limited to the period 
of time used to complete the survey. Survey data were obtained up to 
May 15, 1982. 
Sources of Data 
The survey instrument used to collect data for the study was a near 
replication of the instrument used in the Else study completed in 1977 
(23). Minor revisions were necessitated to respond to the stated hy­
potheses. Assistance in development of the questionnaire was provided 
by teachers, administrators, and board members who have had experience 
with Iowa's Public Employee Relations Act and Dr. Ross Engel, Iowa State 
University. The survey was field tested through a pilot study under the 
supervision of Dr. Anton J. Netusil, Iowa State University. 
Teachers, superintendents, and board members were randomly selected 
from twenty-five large and twenty-five small public school districts in 
Iowa which bargain collectively and from twenty-five nonbargaining public 
school districts in Iowa. 
Much of the material for review of literature was obtained through 
the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) and the Iowa Network 
For Obtaining Resource Materials for Schools (INFORMS). Related disser­
tations from Iowa State University Library also proved to be beneficial 
resource material. 
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Organization of the Study 
The five-chapter approach to reporting research through a disserta­
tion was the organizational basis for this study. In Chapter One, the 
reader is provided with an overview of the specific problem identified 
and undertaken by the researcher. Chapter Two focuses on an in-depth 
review of the literature and was an effort to provide the researcher 
with background essential to complete the study. Chapter Three describes 
data collection and treatment procedures the researcher followed 
in conducting the study. Chapter Four presents the findings of this 
study through statistical tables and a narrative description. Chapter 
Five includes a summary of the findings, the researcher's conclusions 
relative to the study, and recommendations made as a result of the study. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Teachers traditionally have been a relatively silent group. In re­
cent years, however, owing to a general rise in group identity and group 
activism, they have asserted themselves more often and with greater 
vehemence. Collective bargaining is, in part, an institutionalization 
of their group identity and activism. 
In a 1978 nationwide study conducted by the American School Board 
Journal in conjunction with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, collective bargaining was listed as the greatest concern of 
school board members (2). 
Jane Stallings, director of the Teaching and Learning Institute in 
Mountain View, California, said: 
. . . school administrators have seldom been confronted 
by such a combination of problems that includes dwindling 
student populations, decreasing budgets, decreasing test 
scores, increasing ccxnmunity expectations and collective 
bargaining. (Cited in 11, p. 2) 
There is collective bargaining in every state no matter how it is 
disguised. In short, bargaining is a fact of life. National Education 
Association (NEA) representatives no longer leave the bargaining table 
in a huff because ycu call them a union instead of an association (cited 
in 48). 
In Iowa, the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, signed into law 
April 23, 1974, states and defines the rights of public employers and 
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employees. The Act provides that employees may organize and bargain 
collectively with their employers through representatives of their own 
choosing. 
In this chapter, the writer has reviewed the literature relative 
to the history of teacher collective bargaining in the United States, 
examined the changes in the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act since 
its inception, reviewed leading cases heard by individual states and the 
United States Supreme Courts, compared in some detail final offer binding 
arbitration and teacher strike, and reported findings of researchers who 
have studied the impact of collective bargaining upon education. 
Fiscal Restrictions 
In 1980, many collective bargaining observers claimed that the move­
ment toward public employee bargaining, including bargaining by teachers, 
had cooled considerably (58). Support for this contention can be noted 
in the fact that no new states have granted bargaining rights to educa­
tion personnel since 1978. 
It is apparent that the potential for teacher union dominance is 
limited because rampant inflation has been followed by economic restric­
tions and taxpayers are not acquiescent. The support for education is no 
longer present in many parts of the country because all too often the 
public has viewed education as failing. To support this contention, in 
a 1981 Gallup poll (cited in 25), only nine percent of the people polled 
gave the schools an A rating. In 1974, eighteen percent gave the schools 
an A rating. 
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In spite of economic conditions and lack of support, unions often 
are not receptive to management's problem of coping with today's fiscal 
crisis. As a result, there is a growing and separate area of the law that 
may become more important in future years. One of the earliest decisions 
rendered in California in 1979, (Sonoma City Organization of Public Em­
ployees vs. County of Sonoma, 152 Cal. 903) upheld wage increases in 
contracts that had already been ratified in spite of the state legisla­
ture's enactment of a law to void any agreement by a local agency to pay 
a cost of living increase in excess of that granted to state employees 
(48). 
In the case, the state supreme court ruled "... collective bar­
gaining agreements have the same protection as any other contract but 
that the state, under certain circumstances may impair contracts. How­
ever, these were not the circumstances because the fiscal crisis is not 
an emergency so grave as to affect the continued existence of public 
agencies" (48). 
In a similar dispute, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission 
(School District of West Allis - West Milwaukee and West Allis vs. West 
Milwaukee Education Assoc., WERC, Dec., No. 17091, 1979) held that a 
school district cannot refuse to bargain on union economic demands that 
exceed the "guidelines" issued by the President and administered by the 
U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability (48). 
Iowa has a foundation system of financing schools. While a number 
of tax bases support the schools, the use of locally-controlled taxes, 
primarily property tax, is fixed by the state legislature. The key 
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variables are student enrollment and the amount of per student aid given 
by the state. 
Iowa has faced a financial crisis which parallels that experienced 
across the nation. On August 12, 1980, Governor Robert D. Ray issued 
executive order 38, cutting state general fund appropriations across the 
board by 3.6 percent for the fiscal year. Then on December 15, 1980, 
Governor Ray initiated seven steps he was taking to avoid the state's 
June 30, 1981, projected budget deficit. The step which affected school 
districts further reduced spending by one percent. Contracts for 1980-
81 had been ratified before the budget cuts were made and school dis­
tricts did not attempt to void the contracts. 
Financial devastation settled on Iowa schools on March 13, 1981, 
when the hard-fought battle over school finances between boards of educa­
tion and legislators ended with the passage of House File 414. The bill 
reduced the allowable growth from 9.025 percent to 5.0 percent for the 
1981-82 school year. Again, contracts across the state had been ratified 
and were not challenged by school districts. 
The instability caused by declining enrollment and budget cuts im­
posed by the Governor, and the threat of such cuts, has had some effect 
on contract settlements (51). Thus, when determining the impact of bar­
gaining, the present funding situation must also be considered, and it 
must be realized that what may appear to be a result of collective bar­
gaining may in reality be an effect of the financial crisis settling over 
school districts. 
Education U.S.A. (21) reported participants at a public sector 
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labor relations conference in Washington, D.C., in January, 1981, agreed 
that predicted conditions in this decade will bring management and labor 
closer together by necessity. Economic restraints such as tax and spend­
ing limitations and double digit inflation mean less job security for 
public employees and a greater need for local governments to keep costs 
down. 
History of Teachers' Unions and Collective Bargaining 
Teacher associations have been in existence for nearly two hundred 
years. In 1794, the Society of Associated Teachers of New York City was 
established and is considered the nation's first teachers' association. 
Although the Chicago Teachers' Federation was formed in 1897, it did not 
affiliate with the American Federation of Labor, so the distinction of 
becoming the first bona fide teacher labor union in the nation went to 
teachers in San Antonio, Texas, which joined the AFL, September 29, 1902. 
A national union of teachers was organized in 1916 when the American 
Federation of Teachers was formed (17). 
By 1951, the National Education Association was addressing the 
problems facing teachers and was passing resolutions calling for higher 
teacher salaries and greater financial security (cited in 17). 
The U.S. Bureau of Census (cited in 48) reported in 1976 that 68.6 
percent of teachers were members of an organization and only firefighters 
were more likely to be union members. 
Union membership for teachers has not always been a legal right. 
Else (23) traced the legal history of teachers' union membership which 
19 
began in 1917 in Chicago (People ex rel Fursman vs. City of Chicago, 
278 111. 318, 116 N.E. 158) and in Seattle in 1930 (Seattle High School 
Chapter No. 200 of the AFT vs. Sharpies, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac, 994). 
Court decisions in both cases upheld board rules against union member­
ship. 
Federal Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. 
The Act did not extend the right to union membership to public employees, 
however, boards of education began to exhibit more lenient attitudes 
toward membership in teachers' organizations of all kinds (23). 
Sixteen years later in 1951, a Connecticut court decision upheld the 
right of teachers to union membership (Norwalk Teachers' Assn. vs. Board 
of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A (2d) 482) (23). 
In the Wagner Act of 1935, Congress reversed what had been common 
law and federal rule--that no employer could contractually require an 
employee to join or support a labor union—and declared that an employer 
could lawfully agree with a majority-supported union to hire and retain 
only union members. Thus, the "closed shop" agreement was legalized (54). 
Prohibition of the "closed shop" agreement resulted from the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, and since that time, the courts have consistently 
upheld teachers* rights to nonmembership. In a notable case in Montana 
(Benson vs. School District No. 1^  of Silver Bow County, 136 Montana 77, 
344 P. 2d 117, Mt. 1959), the court ruled that a board of education 
lacks authority to require teachers to be union members as a condition 
of receiving an increased salary. In addition, the court said, "an 
agreement by a board of education to hire only union members would be 
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clearly illegal discrimination" (19). 
Pulliam (54) reported another common form of "union security" 
arrangement is the "union shop" agreement. Union-shop agreements do not 
condition initial employment on union membership but require that em­
ployees join the union after a short grace period. This issue was re­
solved in Michigan in a 1977 United States Supreme Court decision 
(Abood vs. Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 97 Ct 1782). 
Although the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 specifically 
excluded public employees from the collective bargaining process, the 
NLRA does establish a model for bargaining which may be instituted with 
school boards by teacher organizations (23). 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the employer 
and the certified union representing its employees are both under a duty 
to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
or conditions of employment. The Supreme Court (NLRB vs. Wooster Divi­
sion of Borg-Wamer Corp., 356 US 342, 78 S Ct 718, 2L. Ed, 2d 823, 1958) 
developed the concept of mandatory subjects of bargaining (28)--those 
matters over which the employer or employee organization can be required 
to bargain at the insistence of either party. 
Else (23) noted the significant historical landmarks of collective 
bargaining. 
1. (Norwalk Teachers' Assn. vs. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 
269, 83 A (2d) 482). 
2. Wisconsin's enactment of the first legislation for teacher-
board bargaining in 1959 which provided the lead for other 
states to follow. 
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3. Executive Order 10988 which developed formal guidelines 
for effective bargaining for federal employees. 
4. Executive Order 11941 which established regulatory agen­
cies to deal with labor relations problems and provides 
for grievance arbitration. 
As the number of teachers in professional organizations increased 
to over 80 percent in 1976 (16, 58), the number of collective bargaining 
agreements also rose significantly. The New York City Bargaining elec­
tion of 1961 awakened teacher associations to the fact that militancy was 
in the cards for the American teacher (17). The United Federaticai of 
Teachers victory was probably the biggest single success in the history 
of teacher organization in the United States. 
As early as 1964, the NEA estimated 100,000 teachers in 346 school 
districts were serving under written contracts. By 1972, a total of 
1,455,329 instructional personnel throughout the nation were covered by 
negotiated contracts (17). The U.S. Bureau of Census reports that of 
the 27,418 collective bargaining agreements in public employment in 1977, 
14,072 were with school districts (cited in 48). 
Ross and Flakus-Mosqueda (58) reported that 32 states grant bar­
gaining rights to teachers by law. McGhehey (48) noted there is collec­
tive bargaining in every state no matter how it is disguised. In short, 
bargaining is a fact of life that is here to stay. 
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Collective Bargaining in Iowa 
The major thrust toward adoption of a bargaining law began follow­
ing the decision in the 1970 case of State Board of Regents vs. United 
packing House Food and Allied Workers, 175 N.W. 2d 110, Iowa (1970) de­
cided by the Iowa Supreme Court (53). The right of public employees to 
organize and join labor organizations was reaffirmed in the Iowa case 
while the denial of strike was also reestablished. The supreme court 
further established that public employers could meet and confer with 
groups of workers about compensation and working conditions. The court 
made it clear that : 
. . .  i f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  d e s i r e s  t o  g i v e  p u b l i c  e m p l o y e e s  
the advantage of collective bargaining in the full sense 
as it is used in private industry, it should do so by 
specific legislation to that effect. (53, p. 2) 
In 1973, after several unsuccessful efforts. Senate file 531 was 
passed by the Senate (53). At the end of the first session of the sixty-
fifth General Assembly, a group of Representatives attempted to force 
consideration of the Senate-passed bill in the House. The bill did not 
receive consideration in the first session (5). 
Early in the second session, the Act came up for consideration as a 
special order of business, meaning there was no committee consideration 
of the Senate-passed bill in the House. The bill was placed on the 
calendar for consideration February 20, 1974 (5). 
Legislators worked to draft amendments and seek compromises in an 
effort to expedite consideration of the bill. Management had expressed 
three main concerns: 
23 
1. that the scope of negotiations "other terms and condi­
tions" was to broad; 
2. final offer binding arbitration was an unwarranted 
delegation of the local decision-making process and 
should be avoided; and 
3. there were no reserved management rights in the Senate-
passed bill. (5, p. 3) 
An attempt was made to put together a coalition to dump the final 
offer binding arbitration section and substitute a strike provision. The 
Iowa State Education Association opposed the strike amendment, viewing 
it as a "killer" amendment (5). The debate lasted for twelve days (32) 
with discussion of 198 amendments, 58 of which were adopted in whole or 
part. 
The Iowa law was signed on April 23, 1974. Effective date of the 
statute was July 1, 1974, with an effective duty to bargain set for 
July 1, 1975 (27). 
As a result, a comprehensive bill (4) for the regulation of public 
employment labor relations in Iowa was enacted. 
According to Pope, to qualify as a ''comprehensive" acc, a public 
employment labor law should include the following: 
The act; 
1. Must list and define the rights of parties involved 
in public employment with regard to labor relations. 
2. Must have a mechanism for the conduct of elections by 
which employee decisions on organizations are deter­
mined . 
3. Must define the public policy on strikes by public em­
ployees and contain provisions for carrying out policy. 
4. Must create a system by which illegal acts, acts counter 
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to the public policy, or acts violative of enunci­
ated rights are regulated. 
5. Must assign the task of administering the Act to a new 
or existing agency and give that agency the necessary 
power to administer. (53, p. 2) 
Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa (59) states the purpose of collec­
tive bargaining in Section 1: 
The general assembly declared that it is the public policy 
of the state to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships 
between government and its employees by permitting public em­
ployees to organize and bargain collectively. . . . 
Strife between boards of education and teachers' unions has been 
substantial and is exhibited by numerous conflicts presented to the Pub­
lic Employment Relations Board (PERB) for rulings and the cases heard 
by the Courts. Through 1980, nine cases have appeared in the Iowa 
Supreme Court (4), 
Rules and Regulations of PERB are outlined in Chapter 660 of the 
Iowa Administrative Code (4), These provisions govern general practices 
and hearing procedures, prohibited practice complaints, bargaining unit 
and bargaining representative determination, elections, and negotiability 
disputes. 
According to Beamer, of all issues raised in labor relations in the 
public sector, among the most significant concerns are the scope of bar­
gaining questions. They arise in several different forms: 
. . . prohibited practice complaints alleging that a party has 
refused to negotiate over mandatory subjects of bargaining; 
petitions for declaratory rulings; or a specialized procedure 
established specifically to address these issues. (4, p. 10) 
Often the questions arise during negotiations: 
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. . . one party presents a demand which the other side refuses 
to consider. In Iowa, this creates significant frustration in 
the bargaining process because of potential delay when all 
bargaining must be completed by the certified budget date of 
the employer, March 15. (4, p. 10) 
Subjects of mandatory bargaining are set forth in a "laundry list" 
fashion which provides a more limited scope than the traditional "wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," used in the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
The Iowa Supreme Court has placed bargaining proposals in three 
categories: mandatory, permissive, and illegal. In two significant de­
cisions, one in Fort Dodge in 1978 (City of Fort Dodge vs. PERB, 275 N.W. 
2d 446, Iowa 1978) and another in Charles City in 1979 (Charles City 
Community School District vs. PERB, 275 N.W. 2d 766, Iowa 1979) the 
courts placed a narrow construction on mandatory bargaining subjects (24). 
In the Fort Dodge case, the court ruled that "wages" and "supple­
mental pay" must be narrowly construed and does not include other eco­
nomic benefits. 
The Iowa Supreme Court concluded in the Charles City case that: 
Iowa's scope of bargaining must be interpreted narrowly, 
and each one of the listed subjects in Section 20.9 of 
the Iowa Code should be interpreted restrictively. 
(24, Section 4, p. 209) 
Additionally, the court applied a two-step analysis in determining 
negotiability of a subject: 
1. Whether the proposal falls within one of the mandatory 
terms of Section 20.9, and 
2. Whether the proposal is illegal. (24, Section 4, p. 209) 
The two-step analysis was applied again in a later Charles City case 
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(Charles City Education Association vs, PERB, 291 N.W. 2d 663, lowa 
1980) regarding the nature of graduate credit hours necessary for ad­
vancement along the salary schedule (24). 
Since the legality of the proposal was not in question, the court 
concluded: "The term 'wages' involves a specific sum or price paid by 
an employer in return for services rendered by an employee" (24, Section 
6, p. 348n). 
Thus, the court reversed the ruling of the district court and held 
the nature of credit hours was a permissive subject of bargaining. 
Legality was the issue in a Marshalltown case (Marshalltown Educa­
tion Association vs. PERB, 299 N.W. 2d 469, Iowa 1980) that examined 
the negotiability of a proposal which would have given administrators 
bargaining unit seniority in their teaching area (24). 
Because "administrators" are "supervisory employees" which are 
specifically excluded fran the coverage of Chapter 20 by Section 4, the 
Iowa Supreme Court held: "The proposal illegally seeks to impose manda­
tory bargaining for the benefit of persons who are excluded both from the 
act and from the bargaining unit" (24, Section 6, p. 352c). 
As roted in the Marshalltown case, illegal proposals are those on 
which negotiations are precluded by law (4), whereas, mandatory subjects 
must be negotiated upon the request of either party and may be submitted 
to a fact-finder or arbitrator. 
Permissive proposals are those on which bargaining is permitted but 
are not required. Insistence upon inclusion of a clause relating to a 
permissive subject of bargaining as a condition precedent to any 
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agreement constitutes a per se refusal to bargain according to the fed­
eral courts (NLKB vs. Wooster Division of the Borg-Wamer Corp., 356 U.S. 
342, 42 LRKM, 2034, 1958) (24). 
Since the outset of debate over collective bargaining legislation, 
relationships between bargaining supporters and those who present oppo­
sition have been severely strained. Discussion has often been bitter 
and, as has been noted, the courts have been called upon to render de­
cisions. How often parties to negotiations will rely on the courts in 
the future is not known. 
The number of cases reaching the courts may be limited since many 
parts of the Act have already been legally clarified and PEEB identi­
fies only two changes in the Act (59) since inception. 
1. The voting requirement for bargaining representation 
has been changed from a majority of those eligible 
to vote to a majority of those voting for passage. 
2. The first two bargaining sessions each year have been 
opened to the public. 
It is this writer's opinion that Tninimal changes in the Act will re­
duce litigation in the future. 
The foregoing discussion of disputes and litigation following the 
PERA in 1974 has been offered here to portray, in brief, the climate 
within which bargaining, since its inception, has taken place in the 
public sector in Iowa. 
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Strike vs. Binding Arbitration 
The first teacher strike in America dates back to 1802, when Thomas 
Peugh, a teacher in a settlement north of Cincinnati, "refused to unlock 
the school and hold classes until such time as the school committee 
formally committed to paper a stipulation giving him at least one after­
noon per month off so that he might move to his new lodging" (17). 
American teachers began flexing their organized muscle after World 
War II. More than one hundred strike threats were carried out from 1942 
through 1959. Almost all threats occurred for the purpose of obtaining 
more money (17). 
The Norwalk, Connecticut, strike in 1946 is the first example in 
the nation's history of a teacher group walking out to achieve bargain­
ing recognition. Five years later, the landmark case in Norwalk estab­
lished the following legal principle. 
Collective bargaining or professional negotiation is 
legally permissible between a board of education and an 
organization of its employees, if the strike threat is 
absent. (23, p. 11) 
Seven states (Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ver­
mont, and Wisconsin) statutorily allow employees of school districts to 
strike under certain circumstances (48). The list of states that allow 
some limited right to strike is gradually growing larger by the refusal 
of the courts to enforce actions against strikes. 
Cresswell and Spargo (13) found the results of controlled studies to 
suggest that legal attempts to regulate strikes are associated with 
strike activity. 
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According to Stern (62), the laws encouraging bargaining seem to 
encourage strikes mildly, penalties are impotent, and use of third 
parties, such as mediators and arbitrators, is positively related to 
strikes. 
Colton (11) found school districts to be the more strike-prone part 
of the public sector. This finding concurs with the findings of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (71), which show that teachers represent 
the occupation most likely to strike. 
It is difficult to characterize strikers and strike activity, how­
ever, recent studies have cast some light on these issues. 
Brumberger (7) randomly surveyed one thousand public school teachers 
from across the United States at the beginning of the 1979 school year. 
She formulated three conclusions from her findings: 
1. The age of strikers clustered around the 25-30 year 
old group. Teachers younger than 25 and older than 
50 were not inclined to strike. 
2. The greatest pressure to strike came from coworkers 
and professional organizations. 
3. More than sixty-five percent of the strikers indi­
cated they would strike in the future. 
Not only are more teachers striking, the duration of strikes appears 
to be increasing. Roger J. Lulow, Ohio Assistant Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, stated: 
There is no apparent trend but the evidence does indicate 
that the average length of strikes has been increasing. 
Empirically, we have concluded that the reason behind the 
increase in length of strikes relates to the fact that 
while in the earlier years work stoppages occurred over 
either recognition of a bargaining agent or dollar amounts 
which were relatively easy to compromise, the strikes 
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today are occurring over issues of control which are more 
philosophical and difficult to compromise. (Cited in 57, 
p. 107) 
The length of strikes is important because of the increased detri­
mental affect on students. Caldwell and Moskalski (cited in 22) found 
that strikes 13 days or more in length have a "negative affect" on stu­
dent achievement. Shorter strikes have little effect. 
In a study of twelve Ohio school districts involved in strikes be­
tween 1977 and 1979, Baker (3) found: 
1. Support for new laws prohibiting teacher strikes 
received majority support from only one group--
superintendents. 
2. Binding interest arbitration was supported only by 
teachers. 
A few states have, for some time, required binding interest arbitra­
tion for the resolution of police and fire contracts as well as those 
engaged in essential municipal service (28). However, the Iowa legisla­
ture, in 1974, became the first in the nation to pass a comprehensive 
collective bargaining act which required final offer arbitration for all 
public employees as the final step for the resolution of impasses in 
their collective negotiations (4, 28). 
Cresswell and Spargo (13) noted that policies for control or reso­
lution of impasses are generally where state government has its most 
direct and detailed intervention into lab or —mana geznent relations* They 
cited two reasons for such intervention: 
1. Work stoppages are potentially damaging to the 
public and it is during impasse that prevention of 
work stoppages seem most necessary and efficacious. 
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2. The impasse situation is often decisive to the 
overall outcomes of bargaining. 
The Iowa PERA contains a detailed procedure for the resolution of 
bargaining impasses, including the stages of mediation, fact-finding, 
and final and binding arbitration. Strikes are prohibited, with strong 
sanctions provided in the event of an illegal work stoppage (4, 24, 50). 
Each party's final offer for impasse items is on an issue-by-issue basis. 
The Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "impasse item" (West Pes 
Moines Education Association vs. PERB, 266 N.W. 2d 118, Iowa 1978). 
The court said: 
. . . "impasse item" means subject categories which re­
quire the parties to submit to an arbitrator their final 
offer on a subject category basis. Each subject category 
submitted shall constitute an impasse item. (28, p. 46) 
Doherty and Gallo (16) discovered that public sector bargaining 
laws in twenty-eight states contain interest arbitration provisions and 
eighteen of these states place time limits on the parties and arbitra­
tors to hasten the process. 
Although not the case in all states, time limits are strictly en­
forced in Iowa. The Iowa Supreme Court (Maguoketa Valley Ed. Assn. vs. 
Maquoketa Valley Community School District, 279 N.W. 2d, 510, Iowa 1979) 
ruled the March 15 deadline mandatory for state contracts and jurisdic­
tional for other public employees (28). 
Grant described the two-fold purpose and design of these provisions 
of law: 
1. The statute contemplates the orderly process of public 
sector negotiations which conforms to the budget-making 
32 
process of the public employer. 
2. It is intended that these dealines build the same 
kind of pressure that a strike deadline would build 
in the dynamics of private sector bargaining. (28, 
p. 40) 
Gallagher and Pegnetter (27), and Doherty and Gallo (16) have con­
curred with Grant that the Iowa impasse procedure increases pressure on 
the parties to settle as the parties progress to each successive step. 
A study by Pashler and Loihl (51) supported the progressive step 
pressure theory. After the first two years of public employee collective 
bargaining in Iowa, they found that over seventy percent of cases uti­
lizing impasse procedures were settled at mediation; eleven to thirteen 
percent of cases utilizing impasse procedures were settled at fact-find­
ing; and, only five to seven percent of all contracts went to arbitra­
tion. These statistics indicate that over ninety-three percent of all 
negotiations are settled without an imposed arbitrated settlement. 
Lentz's (40) study of 1979 teacher contract data resulted in similar 
findings. Three hundred school districts utilized mediation; fifty-
three districts utilized fact-finding; and fourteen districts went to 
final offer arbitration. 
The Iowa State Education Association has been reported as noting 
that fewer than five percent of the contracts have been submitted to 
arbitration. More importantly, "the final offer model has a 'warming' 
effect on the bargaining behavior of the parties, causing them to move 
their positions closer to each other, thereby creating a healthier envi­
ronment in which to reach eventual agreement" (40). 
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These figures lend support to those who favor binding arbitration 
over strike/lockout and have led to strong conclusions. 
Loihl (42) contended that binding arbitration has been an effective 
alternative to strike in providing balance of bargaining power to ensure 
good faith negotiations and the continued delivery of governmental 
service. 
Lentz concluded; 
. . . until public policy is modified, the only rational 
substitute for the right of strike/lockout is arbitration 
on a final offer basis. (40, p. 91) 
Gallagher and Pegnetter stated: 
The Iowa procedure may appear cumbersome in an initial re­
view . . . yet evidence strongly suggests that its arrange­
ment of mediation, fact-finding, and final-offer arbitra­
tion has both encouraged negotiations and provided enough 
satisfaction for the parties to prevent work stoppages. 
(27, p. 338). 
And finally, according to Grant: 
When adverse decisions are made by third party neutrals 
and are supported by some rationale, the anger necessary 
to motivate union members to violate the law and risk the 
penalties for a strike is diffused. (28, p. 59) 
Although support for final offer arbitration abounds, it is not 
without opposition. Bittie noted: 
There seems to persist among employee associations a feeling 
that they may be able to gain more through the neutral than they 
can through the bargaining process. This is particularly frus­
trating to experienced mediators and negotiators experienced in 
the private sector because the midnight strike deadline simply 
does not exist in the Iowa public employee bargaining system. 
To that extent there is a chilling effect in negotiations and a 
tendency to relinquish a decision to a neutral rather than taking 
the bull by the horns and making a decision at the table 
(5, p. 20) 
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Similar opinions persist in other arenas of public employee collec­
tive bargaining as noted in Zagoria's address to the annual conference 
of the College and University Personnel Association in Seattle: 
. . . the push by employee organizations for binding 
arbitration is a recognition that they cannot achieve 
their bargaining aims at the negotiating tables with 
mayors, councilmen, or other representatives or by unpop­
ular strikes, so they wanted to go to a friendlier forum 
of arbitration where they no longer have to deal with 
elected officials who are responsible to and responsive 
to local constituents. (73, p. 5) 
Based on the number of settlements at each progressive step of the 
Iowa impasse procedure, it appears that final offer binding arbitration 
is quite successful. 
However, there persists a feeling with administrators that as long 
as teacher associations have nothing to risk in arbitration, the strike 
may be a more favorable alternative which would restore local control. 
The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining 
Prior to and since the enactment cf public sactor ccllactivc bar­
gaining laws, numerous studies have been completed relative to expected 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining. Harlan Else (23) cited studies 
completed in Iowa before the enactment of the Iowa Public Employment Re­
lations Act. In a study completed at Iowa State University two years 
after teacher collective bargaining became law in Iowa, Else surveyed 
Iowa teachers, superintendents and board members, relative to their ex­
pected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargain­
ing. Notable among the findings in Else's (23) study were: 
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1. Teachers were generally more optimistic about the 
long-range expected outcomes of collective bargaining 
than were board members and superintendents-
2. Teachers with fewer years of experience were generally 
more optimistic concerning outcomes of teacher negotia­
tions than were more experienced teachers. 
3. Teachers from bargaining districts were generally more 
optimistic about the effects of public employee collec­
tive bargaining than were teachers from districts that 
did not bargain. 
4. There was a less optimistic attitude toward teacher 
collective bargaining by teachers from small school 
districts. 
5. Small school districts' superintendents indicated to a 
lesser extent than large school superintendents that col­
lective bargaining would adversely affect classroom in­
struction; that teachers would have less input into 
school district decisions; and that all groups will be­
come more deeply involved politically. 
6. Superintendents from bargaining districts were generally 
less optimistic about the long range effects of collec­
tive bargaining than were their colleagues from nonbar-
gaining districts. 
7. Board members from large school districts believed more 
strongly that collective bargaining was not going to 
result in positive effects for teachers or education 
over a period of years. 
The results of Else's study of perceived expected instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes are compared to the perceived actual outcomes 
in this study in Chapters Four and Five. 
As America witnessed the growth of teachers' unions during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the debate began as to what impact collective bargaining was 
having on the quality of education provided by public schools. 
What extent collective bargaining has impacted on the quality of edu­
cation, with respect to students, is relatively unknown. 
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Eberts and Pierce explained that the effects of collective bargain­
ing on the educational process have remained a mystery for three prin­
cipal reasons: 
1. Education is an imprecise activity. A combination of 
inputs with some students work, while the same combina­
tion with other students fail. 
2. Collective bargaining is just one of many factors which 
shape the learning process. 
3. There has been the lack of a convincing theoretical 
argument as to why unions should make a difference. 
(20, pp. 178-179) 
George Shea supported Eberts and Pierce when he stated; 
Collective bargaining was not designed to improve education. 
The purpose of collective bargaining was to improve wages, 
hours, and working conditions of a group of workers repre­
sented by a union in a defined bargaining unit. (Cited in 
72, p. 11) 
Young (72) reported that although some researchers such as Lorraine 
McDonnell and Anthony Pascal concluded in their study, Organized Teach­
ers in American Schools, that collective bargaining does not seem to 
have affected significantly either classroom operations or the quality 
of educational services that teachers provide, this view is not univer­
sally held. 
Shirley Woods (70) discovered that those teachers under the provi­
sions of a negotiated contract are more likely to perceive themselves 
as being hindered by unnecessary paper work and other duties in per­
formance of their tasks. Such teachers are more likely to go through 
the motions of the job but are not as task oriented. 
Similarly, Eberts and Pierce (cited in 10; 20) found the most 
dramatic effect of collective bargaining on teacher time is that it 
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reduces the amount of time teachers spend on instruction and increases 
the amount of time teachers spend on administrative duties. The average 
amount of time taken from instruction, according to Eberts and Pierce, 
is ten minutes per day. This ten minutes is redistributed among three 
activities : 
1. 3.1 minutes are given to preparation. 
2. 5-3 minutes are given to administrative duties. 
3. 1.6 minutes are given to meetings with parents. 
(Cited in 10, p. 4) 
Eberts and Pierce (Cited in 10; 20) tentatively concluded that 
since collective bargaining reduces instruction more than it increases 
preparation time, it is possible that it reduces student achievement. 
However, Eberts and Pierce (20) also noted the positive effects of 
collective bargaining which include giving teachers a greater stake in 
the negotiated decisions of the district, reducing teacher turnover, 
encouraging the entry into the profession of more qualified teachers, 
and possibly increasing productive teacher attitudes that have been re­
lated tc higher student schievzzezt. 
McDonnell and Pascal downplay the consequences of collective bar­
gaining on the educational process itself. 
We found that students experience the effects of bargaining only 
indirectly and occasionally. Rising personnel costs may result 
in less supplementary learning resources for students, but at the 
same time teachers may be happier and aides and specialists more 
plentiful. An older and more highly credentla led teacher source 
may mean more expertise in instruction, but perhaps less flexi­
bility and energy. How any of these consequences of collective 
bargaining influence the rate of learning or other student in­
terests remains largely unknown. (Cited in 20, p. 13) 
Cresswell and Spargo (13) simply concluded it was too soon to con­
nect collective bargaining, teacher contact time, and student achievement, 
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Research by Glass (cited in 18) indicated that as class size de­
creases, student achievement increases. Most of the reduction in average 
class size came after 1965 when collective bargaining began in earnest. 
Average elementary class size across the nation dropped from twenty-
eight students to twenty-four students between 1965-1975. During the 
same period, the average secondary class size in America's public schools 
dropped from twenty-two students to twenty students (55). 
Additional research (20, 52) soundly supports the contention that 
collective bargaining has reduced class size at least slightly. Since 
class size cannot be bargained directly, the reduction may be due to 
greater security for teachers, as a result of collective bargaining, 
while enrollments declined. 
Perry (52), also, found that unions and management have accepted 
class size as a working condition issue and not a policy issue. 
The literature provides conflicting evidence relative to the im­
pact of collective bargaining on the length of the school day and the 
school year (14, 20, 52, 68). 
Wiebrecht surveyed one hundred bargaining and nonbargaining school 
districts in the fifty states and found the length of the campus day for 
teachers is longer in bargaining school districts. Similarly, he dis­
covered a longer school year in bargaining districts (68). 
Quite different findings were noted by Charles Perry (52). In the 
collective bargaining relationships he studied, bargaining contributed 
to a reduction of the school day by thirty to thirty-five minutes. Al­
though not conclusive, he suggested bargaining may have been responsible 
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for a trend to have school kept open only the minimum number of days re­
quired by law. 
McDonnell and Pascal's (cited in 20) findings are less convincing as 
they suggest only that bargaining may have resulted in students attend­
ing classes for fewer hours per day and fewer days per year. 
McDonnell and Pascal (cited in 20) concluded that negotiated con­
tracts reflect concerns of unions for wages and fringes, working condi­
tions, job security, and issues of educational policy in that order of 
priority. 
Studies (20, 72) conclude that teacher turnover is less in districts 
which bargain collectively. As a result of a survey conducted in New 
York and Michigan school districts, Eberts and Pierce arrived at two sig­
nificant conclusions: 
1. Teacher turnover is greater in non-union districts 
and non-union districts are more likely to release 
experienced teachers for younger, less costly 
teachers. 
2. Unionized districts maintain a larger percent of 
teachers relative to the percent decline in en­
rollment than do non-unionized districts. 
(20, p. 181) 
They further conclude : 
The presence of a reduction in force (RIF) clause based 
on seniority reduced the quit rate of more experienced 
teachers but increased the propensity to quit of less 
experienced teachers. (17, p. 185) 
Young (72) expressed the idea that some people who are less con­
scientious feel more protected as a result of collective bargaining. She 
posed it is a normal position of the union to protect its members whether 
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they are right or wrong. 
It might be surmised that increased job security would lead to im­
proved teacher morale, however, such speculation has not been supported 
in the literature. Indirectly, the evidence points in the opposite 
direction. Doherty (15) noted that the time of greatest growth in bar­
gaining activity, the mid and late sixties, experienced a great drop in 
teacher morale. 
Woods (70) found teachers perceiving morale to be higher in those 
school districts that do not have a negotiated agreement. Although the 
literature (13, 15, 20) is not conclusive relative to the impact of col­
lective bargaining on teacher morale, the possibility is presented that 
with the overall decline of support and confidence in public education 
witnessed of late, the gains from bargaining may have kept morale from 
dropping even further. However, there is no real basis to date for 
assuming positive or negative effects of bargaining on morale. 
Research (36, 37, 13, 68, 70) has indicated that teachers and admin­
istrators hold differing views on collective bargaining which may lead 
to strained relations, especially at the building level. A closer re­
view suggests relationships may be affected more by leadership style 
than by collective bargaining. 
In a 1978 study of Iowa teachers and administrators' perceptions 
toward specific concerns about schools operating under the provisions of 
the FERA, Jacobsen (36) concluded: 
1. Teachers and administrators remain polarized in their 
views toward bargaining. 
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2. Bargaining has thus far not harmed the relationship 
between teachers and administrators. 
Based on studies completed by McDonnell and Pascal, Kerchner, 
Colton, et al., Cresswell and Spargo (13) observed that the existence 
of the union structure and negotiated grievance procedures does change 
relationships between teachers and administrators at the building level. 
They concluded, in general, the changes reduce the decision-making 
power of the administrator. 
Recent studies (69, 70) in Iowa and Ohio provided further evidence 
concerning changing relationships between teachers and principals as a 
result of collective bargaining. 
Albert Wood (69) found Iowa teachers under negotiated contracts 
more likely to perceive their principals as failing to motivate the 
staff by the example he/she sets. 
Shirley Woods (70) discovered that both elementary and secondary 
teachers perceived their principals as exhibiting more leadership by 
example in those schools that did not have a negotiated contract. Addi­
tionally, she found that elementary teachers perceive their principals 
as being more aloof, but that secondary teachers perceive their princi­
pals being less so in school districts lacking a negotiated agreement as 
compared to those that operate under the provisions of such an agreement. 
In terms of working together, Wiebrscht (68) concluded that curric­
ulum development is more an administrative responsibility in bargaining 
schools while it is a joint effort between teachers and administrators 
in nonbargaining schools. 
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Two university researchers have credited building principals with 
creating the relationships which exist between teachers and adminis­
trators rather than collective bargaining (12) 
Susan Moore Johnson, Howard University, provided evidence from her 
study that suggests the administrative styles of principals are the 
central determinant in shaping labor relations and setting the level of 
teacher services in a school. Johnson concluded; 
Teachers were prepared to support a principal who demon­
strated that their schools could be run well. For most 
teachers, being part of a good school took precedence 
over union membership or close enforcement of the con­
tract. (Cited in 12, p. 4) 
Similarly, Elizabeth Cohen (cited in 12), Stanford University, noted 
that studies have shewn that those principals who are effective rely on 
political skills, negotiations, and reciprocity. This modus operandi is 
an exchange of "chips" between principal and teachers, in which adminis­
trative support for teacher concerns is exchanged for teacher coopera­
tion with administrative decisions. 
In a conflicting viewpoint, Lieberman (41) argued that public sector 
collective bargaining is inconsistent with democratic government and 
predicts its demise in the next twenty years. 
Perry (52) examined a decade of collective bargaining in nine 
school districts and concluded that the primary effect of collective bar­
gaining has been on the improvement of salaries and working conditions. 
Taken together, the body of evidence on wage impacts of union activ­
ity points to a small, but positive, independent effect for unionism 
(13, 26, 29, 31, 68, 60). The estimates of the independent effect 
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range from zero to thirty percent when wages are measured directly. 
Eberts and Pierce (20) suggest that differences are much smaller repre­
senting only zero to four percent between bargaining and nonbargaining 
districts. 
Gutman (29) studied teacher salary movement in school districts 
in ninety-three central cities and concluded that, although bargaining 
appears to have increased the M.A. salary at the maximum experience 
level by five percent, it seemed not to have caused any significant im­
provement in salaries at the B.A. level or for teachers with little ex­
perience . 
Wiebrecht (68) also discovered that teachers are receiving larger 
monetary rewards for their experience and their formal education in col­
lective bargaining public schools than in nonbargaining schools while the 
beginning salaries are not significantly different in bargaining schools. 
Positive salary gains as a result of teacher collective bargaining 
were noted in Gallagher's (26) study. He found the M.A. base for Illi­
nois teachers in bargaining districts to be 3.1 percent higher than in 
nonbargaining districts. M.A. maximum salaries in bargaining districts 
were 4.1 percent higher than in nonbargaining districts. 
Holmes (31) found an approximately seven percent increase in gross 
teacher wages associated with union activity. He also noted a reduction 
in male-female differentials (from $610 to $436) between no union and 
high union activity, and a similar reduction in elementary-secondary 
differentials. 
Similar findings were noted by Moore (46) in a study of the effects 
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of collective bargaining on internal salary structures in the public 
schools of Nebraska. Results of his study indicate that collective bar­
gaining reduced the secondary-elementary salary differential by four 
hundred forty dollars in the 1970-1971 school year. 
Although most studies favor bargaining districts relative to salary 
and fringe benefits, a recent Iowa study suggests a positive effect in 
nonbargaining districts. 
Albert Wood (69) compared changes in teacher salaries, fringe bene­
fits, and selected contract provisions between sixty-six Iowa school 
districts without formal bargaining units and sixty-six comparable 
(based on enrollment and per pupil expenditures) Iowa districts operat­
ing under formal negotiated agreements. Notable among Wood's (69) find­
ings were : 
1. For the period base year (1975-76) to first year (1976-77), 
no significant differences between mean gains were detected 
between bargaining and non-bargaining districts for any of 
ten salary schedule points. 
2. One fringe benefit (major medical insurance) displayed a 
statistically significant difference favoring non-bargain­
ing districts. Life, dental and long term disability 
insurances were offered by too few districts to make mean­
ingful comparisons. 
3. Gains made by teachers in fringe benefits and in eight of 
ten salary measures were not significantly different be­
tween bargaining and non-bargaining districts for the period 
base year through the fourth year of negotiations. 
4. Statistically significant higher gains were received by 
teachers in bargaining districts for two salary measures: 
M.A. base ($118 more) and M.A, plus five years experience 
($134 more)• 
5. Gains in salary measures, though not large, tended to favor 
teachers in non-bargaining districts during the first year 
of negotiations. 
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6. Gains in salary measures, though not large, tended 
to favor teachers in bargaining districts over the 
four years of negotiations. 
7, Bargaining and non-bargaining districts when matched 
by enrollment and per pupil expenditures in the year 
prior to collective bargaining had but minor differ­
ences in salary schedule amounts, fringe benefits, 
and personnel practices. 
As a result of his findings. Wood (69) concluded that factors other 
than differences in salary schedule amounts, fringe benefits, and per­
sonnel practices contribute to districts entering into or abstaining 
from collective bargaining in Iowa. 
In summary, the literature seems to indicate that teacher collec­
tive bargaining has had an impact on public education. Mitchell, Kerch-
ner, Erck and Pryor (44) best summed up the impact of bargaining when 
they said that collective bargaining for public school teachers is of 
great significance and not merely a technical alteration in educational 
operations. Their point is emphasized by a California legislative staff 
consultant who remarked that recent legislative reform measures "look 
like popguns compared to the howitzer of collective bargaining." 
Conclusion 
Teacher collective bargaining has grown rapidly from its innocent 
infancy to affect every state in the union. Collective bargaining has 
become so highly visible it has caused respondents in the Thirteenth 
Annual Survey of the Public's Attitudes toward the Public Schools to 
indicate, by more than a two-to-one margin, that unionization of teachers 
has hurt the quality of public school education in the United States (25). 
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In a recent survey of public school administrators, collective 
bargaining with teachers was identified as a major problem with 40.6 per­
cent of the respondents (1). 
Time has allowed for the development of alternatives to work stop­
pages and the literature indicates final offer binding arbitration has 
been quite successful in Iowa providing some of the pressures of a 
strike deadline but eliminating the discontinuance of services to school-
age children. 
The verdict is "still out" relative to the effect of collective 
bargaining on student achievement. Proponents may argue that bargaining 
has reduced class size and retained more experienced, highly qualified 
educators, thus providing for increased student achievement although 
research results are missing or inconclusive in this area. Opponents 
stress that collective bargaining was never designed to improve educa­
tion, and there are too many variables to consider even if one desires 
to study the impact of bargaining on student achievement. 
Numerous instructional and noninstructional outcomes of collective 
bargaining have been studied in recent years. The literature reveals 
that the primary effect of collective bargaining has been on the improve­
ment of salaries and working conditions. However, the positive or nega­
tive effect is not totally clear-
People associated with public education in Iowa have experienced 
the beginning of a new era in public employee-employer relationships. 
It is time to determine the impact of collective bargaining on public 
education in Iowa. Educators in Iowa can assert their professionalism 
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by carefully evaluating the direction in which collective bargaining 
has moved education. The students of Iowa should benefit from such an 
assessment. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The primary purpose of this study was to collect data to determine 
if there were significant differences in the actual instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 
(PERA) between and among randomly selected samples of elementary teach­
ers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members in Iowa and 
to compare, by position, the "actual" instructional and noninstructional 
outcomes with the "expected" instructional and noninstructional outcomes 
of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act as concluded in Else's 1977 
study (23). This chapter describes the methods and procedures that were 
used to gather and analyze the data required for completion of the study. 
Development of the Questionnaire 
The survey instrument was constructed in two parts. The first sec­
tion asked for specific information pertaining to the respondent: The 
respondent's role in the school district; sex; total number of years as 
a teacher; the number of years served in a bargaining unit, if any, from 
respondents in nonbargaining school districts; whether the financial 
remuneration from teaching was a primary or secondary source of income; 
experience on the bargaining team at the bargaining table as a teacher 
or board member; whether the teacher or board member is a parent or non-
parent ; number of years as a superintendent from superintendent respond­
ents ; and whether the respondent is from a school district which has a 
certified teacher bargaining unit. 
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The second and major portion of the questionnaire required responses 
on a five-point scale to seventy-seven "actual outcome" statements. The 
"expected outcome" statements developed by Harlan Else and Iowa State 
University and used in the 1977 Else (23) study were revised with addi­
tions and deletions made in the total list to develop the list of 
"actual outcome" statements. 
The first draft of the survey instrument was submitted to the follow­
ing persons for review and suggestions : 
Ross Engel: Professor of Education Administration 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
Lyle Kehm: Executive Secretary 
Iowa Association of School Administrators 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Gaylord Tryon: Executive Secretary 
Iowa Association of Elementary and Middle 
School Principals 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Wayne Leuders: Assistant Executive Director 
Iowa School Board Association 
Des Moines, Iowa 
David Paris; Chief Negotiator for the Galva-Holstein Education 
Association 
Galva-Holstein Community Schools 
Holstein, Iowa 
Valgene Wiese : President, Board of Education 
Galva-Holstein Community Schools 
Holstein, Iowa 
Suggestions from these persons were used in refining the survey 
instrument used in the pilot study. 
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The Pilot Study 
Administrators, board members, and teachers in the following five 
Iowa school districts participated in the pilot test of the survey in­
strument: Battle Creek Community School District; Cherokee Community 
School District; Galva-Holstein Community School District; Ida Grove 
Community School District; and Willow Community School District. Upon 
return of the pilot questionnaires, suggestions provided by the respond­
ents were considered in revising the form and content of the instrument 
to improve clarity. Questions were placed in ten scales as specified 
in the 1977 study (23). Reliability of questions in the ten scales was 
computed. The reliability coefficients range by scales was .52 (Sala­
ries and Fringes) to .80 (Job satisfaction) with the exception of the 
Budget scale which had a reliability coefficient of .18. Reliability 
decreases as the number of items decrease. The Budget scale consisted 
of only two questions which accounted for the low reliability. 
Selection of the Sample 
Selection of the sample of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents and board members was drawn from the population of 
teachers, superintendents, and board members of twenty-five randomly 
selected large school districts in Iowa, except Des Koines, with a stu­
dent enrollment of nine hundred or more, and a certified bargaining unit ; 
twenty-five randomly selected small school districts in Iowa with a stu­
dent enrollment of four hundred or less, and a certified bargaining unit; 
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and twenty-five randomly selected school districts in Iowa which did 
not have certified bargaining units. The Department of Public Instruc­
tion states that there are one hundred and twenty-seven schools in Iowa 
with an enrollment of nine hundred or more students and one hundred 
twenty-six public schools in Iowa with an enrollment of four hundred or 
less. Every fifth school in the two groups of schools with enrollments 
over nine hundred and less than four hundred students that bargain col­
lectively and every other school in the nonbargaining group were selected. 
Every other school district from an alphabetically-arranged list in the 
nonbargaining group was selected to get a better mix of large and small 
schools. A sample of seventy-five elementary teachers, seventy-five 
secondary teachers, twenty-five superintendents, and twenty-five board 
members was randomly chosen by selecting every eighth teacher from a 
list provided by the Department of Public Instruction from each of the 
three groups of twenty-five school districts and every fourth board 
member in each school district from a list provided by the Iowa Asso­
ciation of School Boards. To encourage a greater percentage response 
from participants surveyed, a personal contact was made with the execu­
tive secretaries or presidents of each of the professional organizations 
representing teachers, superintendents, and board members in Icwa. 
Those contacted included: George Duvall, President of the Iowa State 
Education Association; Dr. Lyle Kehm, Executive Secretary of the Iowa 
Association of School Administrators (lASA); and Ted Davidson, Execu­
tive Director of the Iowa Association of School Boards (lASB). Each 
executive secretary was asked to provide a letter of recommendation to 
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their membership encouraging them to assist with the study by completing 
and returning the questionnaire. The letters of recommendation received 
from lASA and lASB were then included with each packet containing the 
questionnaire. The survey was administered to the randomly selected 
sample via the U.S. mail. 
It was projected that with a return of 65 percent of the question­
naires a sample of this size would yield sufficient numbers of respond­
ents to provide data necessary to accurately represent the population. 
Collection of Data 
Letters were sent to superintendents in the seventy-five randomly-
selected school districts. The letter introduced the study and asked 
the superintendent to volunteer to serve as the contact person and vol­
unteer his/her district for participation in the study. All seventy-
five superintendents returned a stamped postcard expressing their will­
ingness to cooperate in the study. 
Seventy-five packets each containing eight questionnaires were sent 
tc the participating school districts. Questionnaires in each packet 
were contained in envelopes specifying the teachers and board members 
randomly selected. A total of six hundred questionnaires were distrib­
uted to the selected sample of teachers, superintendents, and board 
members in twenty-five large and twenty-five small school districts in 
Iowa with certified bargaining units and twenty-five school districts 
absent certified bargaining units. The superintendent in each district 
was asked to distribute and collect the questionnaires. When completed. 
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participants sealed the questionnaires in envelopes before returning to 
the superintendent. Two weeks after the initial mailing, a follow-up 
letter with additional copies of the questionnaire was mailed to super­
intendents who had not yet responded. Two weeks after the second mail­
ing, a reminder via a telephone call was made to those superintendents 
who had still not responded. Contact persons were asked to encourage 
completion of unretumed questionnaires and to return all completed 
questionnaires within one week. Since a total of 69.5 percent of those 
who were initially selected for the study sample had responded follow­
ing the telephone reminder, no further follow-up was done. 
Treatment of the Data 
An attempt was made via the questionnaire to describe each respond­
ent. All data collected were categorized into cells according to: 1) 
whether a certified teacher bargaining unit existed in the respondent's 
district, 2) size of the district based on student enrollment, 3) re­
spondent's school role, 4) parental status of respondent, 5) teacher sex, 
6) years of experience in the present role for superintendents and 
teachers, 7) whether the financial remuneration the teachers received 
from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income, and 
8) whether the teachers and board members have served as members of the 
bargaining team at the bargaining table. 
Actual instructional and noninstructional outcome statements were 
categorized into ten scales as shown in Appendix D. The ten scales are: 
1) Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, 2) Board Power, 3) Job 
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Satisfaction, 4) Salaries/Fringes, 5) Instruction, 6) Teacher Input, 
7) Public Opinion, 8) Working Conditions, 9) Budget, and 10) Political 
Involvement. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed for each 
of the seventy-five "expected outcome" statements in the 1977 Else (23) 
study to determine the item's correlation to its assigned scale and to 
every other scale. All items correlated to their assigned scale at the 
.001 significance level. 
Respondents were asked to make two decisions regarding a given 
stimulus: 1) a directional judgment as to whether collective bargaining 
had improved (increased) or diminished (decreased) the instructional or 
noninstructional condition posed; and 2) an intensity judgment (65). 
Values from 1 (slight) to 5 (strong) were assigned to determine how 
strongly the respondent perceived collective bargaining to either im­
prove (increase) or diminish (decrease) the condition posed. The indi­
vidual response was then transformed to an eleven-point continuum. An 
expanded response of 1 indicated that the individual perceived the con­
dition presented in the statement to have been strongly diminished (de­
creased) as a result of collective bargaining and a response of 11 indi­
cated that the respondent felt the actual instructional or noninstruc­
tional outcome of collective bargaining had been strongly increased or 
improved. A "no effect" or neutral response was coded as 6. Numerical 
values from 1 to 11 were assumed to have equal intervals between the re­
sponse values- Mean scores were computed for each of the comparison 
groups on each of the scales by using the aforementioned eleven-point 
scale. An analysis of variance was then conducted with the F-ratio 
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being used to test the hypotheses to determine which group means for 
each scale were significantly different from the other group means where 
more than two groups were being compared; Duncan's Multiple Range Test 
was used in conjunction with each of the hypotheses. 
A comparison was made between the two studies on the test for sig­
nificant differences between the groups by position with respect to the 
instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on each of the ten 
scales. The significant differences in group means for each scale de­
termined by Duncan's Multiple Range Test were compared to the signifi­
cant differences in group means in the 1977 study to determine whether 
the differences between groups by position had changed or remained 
constant. 
Summary 
This chapter described in detail the purpose and step-by-step pro­
cedure of the study. The questionnaire wrs reviewed and the pilot study 
was described. The method of selecting the sample and the criteria used 
to categorize respondents were described. The procedures of data collec­
tion and data treatment were detailed. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 
The primary purpose of this study was to collect data to determine 
if there were significant differences in the actual instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act 
and to compare the actual outcomes of collective bargaining with the ex­
pected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of bargaining as con­
cluded in the Else study completed in 1977. Following the collection of 
data, the statistical analyses described in the previous chapter were 
conducted. The findings of those analyses, relative to the specific 
hypotheses of the investigation, are herein reported. 
Profile of the Respondents 
The profile of teacher respondents indicates a total of 306 teachers 
responded to the questionnaire. The teachers provided the following in­
formation: grade level, elementary (K-6) or secondary (7-12); whether 
their school district has a formal bargaining unit; if their district 
does not have a formal bargaining unit, they were asked if they had ever 
had experience with a bargaining district and if so, how many years; 
whether or not they are a parent; total number of years teaching experi­
ence; their sex; whether their teaching salary is a primary or secondary 
source of family income; and whether they have served as a member of the 
bargaining team at the bargaining table. Table 1 illustrates the number 
and percent of teachers indicating each variable. 
A total of sixty-six superintendents responded to the survey. 
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Table 1, Profile of teacher respondents 
Percent of 
Variables Number teacher respondents 
Position 
Elementary (K-6) 148 48.4 
Secondary (7-12) 158 51.6 
Bargaining unit 
Yes 193 63.1 
No 113 36.9 
Sex 
Male 119 38.9 
Female 187 61.1 
District size (if bargaining) 
Twenty-five small 79 40.9 
Twenty-five large 113 58.5 
Teaching experience 
0-5 years 62 20.3 
6-10 years 64 20.9 
11-15 years 59 19.3 
16-20 years 46 15.0 
More than 20 years 75 24.5 
Teaching salary 
Primary source of family income 236 77.1 
Secondary source of family income 70 22.9 
Parent 
Yes 210 68.6 
No 89 29.1 
Bargaining team member at 
bargaining table 
Yes 104 34.0 
No 200 65.4 
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Superintendents were asked to indicate whether their school district has 
a formal bargaining unit and their total number of years of experience 
as a superintendent. Table 2 illustrates the number and percent of 
superintendents indicating each variable. 
Table 2. Profile of superintendent respondents 
Percent of 
Variables Number superintendent 
respondents 
Bargaining unit 
Yes 44 66.7 
No 22 33.3 
District size (if bargaining) 
Twenty-five small 22 50.0 
Twenty-five large 22 50.0 
Superintendent years of experience 
0-5 years 17 25.8 
6-10 years 13 19.7 
11-15 years 13 19.7 
16-20 yssrs 9 13.ô 
More than 20 years 13 19.7 
A total of forty-six board members responded to the questionnaire. 
Board members were asked to indicate whether their school district has a 
certified collective bargaining unit, whether they are a parent, and 
whether they have served as a member at the bargaining table. Table 3 
illustrates the number and percent of board members indicating each 
variable. 
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Table 3, Profile of board member respondents 
Percent of 
Variables Number board member 
respondents 
Bargaining unit 
Yes 30 65.2 
No 16 34.8 
District size (if bargaining) 
Twenty-five small 15 50.0 
Twenty-five large 15 50.0 
Parent 
Yes 45 97.8 
No 1 2.2 
Bargaining team member 
at bargaining table 
Yes 16 34.8 
No 30 65.2 
Hypothesis Number One 
There are no significant differences in observed instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Rela­
tions Act between the groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
Analysis of variance was used to determine the significance of dif­
ferences in means between the groups on the scales as presented in 
Appendix D and reported in Table 4, 
In this study, mean scores were computed by using an increase/ 
decrease mode and a five-point contingency scale. When answering the 
questionnaire, respondents indicated whether the condition was increased. 
Table 4. Test for significant differences between the groups by position with respect to the 
actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on each of the scales 
Elementary Secondary Board 
Scales teachers teachers Superintendents members F 
(n=147) (n=158) (n=66) (n=46) ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.67 6.55 5.54 6.08 19 .50** 
Board power 7.26 7.25 6.88 6.63 5.38** 
Job satisfaction 6.09 5.99 4.29 5.05 41.28** 
Salary-fringes 7.44 7.76 6.99 7.15 5.26** 
Instruction 6.48 6.61 5.09 5.43 36.21** 
Teacher input 6..30 6.28 5.69 5.87 6.34** 
Public opinion 5.31 5.09 2.92 3.58 37.08** 
Working conditions 7.57 7.85 7.95 7.19 4.37** 
Budget 6 .44 6.25 5.12 4.78 20.23** 
Political Involvement 8.27 8.37 9.51 8.43 12.95** 
Significant: at the 0.01 level. 
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decreased or unchanged as a result of collective bargaining. If re­
spondents perceived the condition to increase or decrease, they then de­
termined the degree of change by checking 1 if the change was slight 
through 5 if the change was strong. 
To determine mean scores a "decreased" response was assigned values 
of 1 for a strong decrease through 5 for a slight decrease. An un­
changed response was assigned a value of 6 and an increased response was 
assigned values ranging from 7 (slight) through 11 (strong). In Table 
4, on the scale Job Satisfaction, the 147 elementary teachers had an 
actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean score of 6.09, 
while the 66 superintendents had a mean score of 4.29. The elementary 
teachers' mean score of 6.09 indicates that they feel collective bargain­
ing has resulted in almost no change in job satisfaction. Superinten­
dents' mean score points out that they feel job satisfaction has de­
creased as a result of collective bargaining. All actual instructional 
and noninstructional outcome mean scores in the tables showing F-ratios 
and those indicating Duncan's Multiple Range Test in the remainder of 
Chapter 4 should be interpreted in the manner described above. 
On all of the scales there were significant differences at the 
.01 level between the groups, therefore, the null hypothesis was re­
jected. 
The Duncan Multiple Range test was used to ascertain which group 
means were significantly different and which were not. Group differ­
ences are reported in Table 5. It should be noted that there is an 
overlapping in seme of the subsets. This is a result of the mean scores 
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Table 5. Duncan's Multiple Range Test to determine which group means 
are significantly different (Elementary teachers = Group 1, 
Secondary teachers = Group 2, Superintendents = Group 3, and 
Board members = Group 4) 
Scales Group means in ranges from smallest to largest^  
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 
Group 3 
5.54 
Group 4 
6.08 
Group 2 
6.55 
Group 1 
6.67 
Board power Group 4 
6.63 
Group 3 
6.88 
Group 2 
7.25 
Group 1 
7.26 
Job satisfaction Group 3 
4.29 
Group 4 
5.05 
Group 2 
5.99 
Group 1 
6.09 
Salary-fringes Group 3 
6.99 
Group 4 
7.15 
Group 1 
7.44 
Group 2 
7.76 
Instruction Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
5,09 5.43 6.48 6.61 
Teacher input Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
5.69 5.87 6.28 6.30 
Public opinion Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
2.92 3.58 5.09 5.31 
TiTfwT/- < -î +• -T /-sTi c Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
7.19 7.57 7.85 7.95 
Budget 
Political involvement 
Group 4 Group 3 
4.78 5.12 
Group 1 Group 2 
8.27 8.37 
Group 2 Group 1 
6.25 6.44 
Group 4 Group 3 
8.43 9.51 
G^roup means underscored by the same line are not significantly dif­
ferent at the 0.05 level. Group means not underscored by the same line 
are significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
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being at the extreme high or low of a homogeneous subset. For example, 
on the scale Working Conditions, there was a significant difference at 
the .05 level between the subsets board members-elementary teachers and 
elementary teachers-secondary teachers-superintendents. The mean score 
of 7.57 recorded by elementary teachers was at the high end of the range 
of scores for subset one but at the low end of the range of mean scores 
for subset two. 
For each of the scales Board Power, Instruction, Teacher Input, 
Public Opinion, and Budget, there was no significant difference at the 
.05 level between the means of the groups of elementary teachers and 
secondary teachers nor between the means of the groups of superinten­
dents and board members. There was a significant difference at the .05 
level between the means of the subsets elementary teachers-secondary 
teachers and superintendents-board members. 
For the scales Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations and Job Satis­
faction, there was no significant difference at the .05 level between 
the means of the groups of elementary teachers and secondary teachers, 
however, there was a significant difference between the means of the 
groups of superintendents, board members and the subset of elementary 
teachers-secondary teachers. 
For the scale Salary-Fringes, there was no significant difference 
at the .05 level between the means of the groups of superintendents and 
board members nor between the means of elementary teachers and secondary 
teachers nor between the means of the groups of board members and ele­
mentary teachers. There was a significant difference at the .05 level 
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between the means of subsets superintendents-board members, elementary 
teachers-secondary teachers, and board members-elementary teachers. 
For the scale Working Conditions, there was no significant differ­
ence at the .05 level between the means of the groups of board members 
and elementary teachers nor between the means of the groups of elemen­
tary teachers, secondary teachers and superintendents. There was a 
significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the subsets 
board members-elementary teachers and elementary teachers-secondary 
teachers-superintendents. 
For the scale Political Involvement, there was no significant dif­
ference at the .05 level between the means of the groups of elementary 
teachers, secondary teachers, and board members. However, there was a 
significant difference between the means of the group of superintendents 
and the subset of elementary teachers-seondary teachers-board members. 
Hypothesis Number Two 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act among groups of Iowa teachers, superintendents, and 
board members in twenty-five large student enrollment school dis­
tricts as compared to those from twenty-five small student en­
rollment districts. 
Hypothesis Number Two was tested using the analysis of variance for 
each of the ten actual outcome scales for the three groups surveyed. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the teachers' mean scores for each of the 
ten scales. 
As indicated in Table 6, there was no significant difference at 
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Table 6. Tests for significant differences between Iowa teachers in 
large districts and small districts with respect to the actual 
instructional and nohinstructional outcome mean scores on 
each of the scales 
Small district Large district 
Scales teachers teachers F 
(n=79) (n=113) ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.69 6.51 1.08 
Board power 7.40 7.34 0.13 
Job satisfaction 6.12 5.93 1.15 
Salaries-fringes 7.85 7.51 2.40 
Instruction 6.64 6.38 2.34 
Teacher input 6.30 6,02 3.04 
Public opinion 5.29 5.05 0.72 
Working conditions 7.86 7.59 1.87 
Budget 6.35 6.51 0.45 
Political involvement 8.43 8-48 0.05 
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the .05 level between teachers in large districts and those in small 
districts on any of the ten scales. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
not rejected. 
The teachers tend to agree that collective bargaining has increased 
slightly Board Power, Salaries-Fringes, and somewhat improved Work Condi­
tions. Teachers in large districts and small districts agree that 
Political Involvement has been increased to a greater extent as a re­
sult of the Public Employment Relations Act. 
On all other scales except Public Opinion, teachers from large and 
small districts believe that collective bargaining has had no effect. 
Both groups agree that Public Opinion has decreased slightly since col­
lective bargaining began. 
Analysis of variance was used to measure mean differences on the 
ten scales between Iowa superintendents from large districts and those 
from small districts. The mean scores and F-ratios are reported in 
Table 7. 
The null hypothesis was not rejected on nine of the ten scales 
since there was no significant differences in mean scores between large 
and small district superintendents. Superintendents of large schools 
perceive a strong increase in Political Involvement as a result of 
collective bargaining and their perceptions differ significantly at the 
.05 level frcsn superintendents of small school districts. On the 
Political Involvement scale the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Significant differences in large district board members' mean 
scores and the mean scores of those in small districts were tested 
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Table 7. Tests for significant differences between Iowa superintendents 
in large districts and those in small districts with respect 
to the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on the ten scales 
Small district Large district 
Scales superintendents superintendents F 
(n=22) (n=2l) ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 5.61 5.65 0.03 
Board power 6.79 7.12 1.37 
Job satisfaction 4.39 4.33 0.02 
Salaries-fringes 6.75 7.39 2.08 
Instruction 5.24 5.20 0.03 
Teacher input 5.73 5.72 0.00 
Public opinion 2.98 2.95 0.01 
Working conditions 7.88 8.08 0.45 
Budget 5.70 4.81 2.54 
Political involvement 8.85 9.90 7.19* 
S^ignificant at the 0.05 level. 
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through use of analysis of variance measures. Table 8 reports the mean 
scores for each of the groups of board members. 
Only on the scale of statements relating to Political Involvement 
was there a significant difference at the .05 level between board mem­
bers from large districts and those from small districts. Large dis­
trict board members felt more strongly relative to the increase in 
Political Involvement, hence the null hypothesis was rejected for that 
scale. There were no significant differences on the other nine scales, 
thus the null hypothesis was not rejected. 
Hypothesis Number Three 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers rela­
tive to their differences in number of years teaching experience. 
Analysis of variance was used to measure mean differences between 
groups of Iowa elementary and secondary teachers with respect to their 
perceptions relating to teacher collective bargaining according to years 
of teaching experience. 
Table 9 provides mean scores for each of the subgroups of elementary 
teachers. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the ten scales 
when considering experience level of elementary teachers. 
Table 10a lists the computed mean scores and F-ratics for lews secon­
dary teachers according to years of teacher experience and relating to 
their perceptions of the actual effects of teacher collective bargaining. 
No significant differences, at the .05 level, in mean scores of secondary 
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Table 8. Tests for significant differences between Iowa board members 
in large districts and those in small districts with respect 
to the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Small district Large district 
board members board members F 
(n=15) (n=15) ratio 
Tea cher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.53 6.36 0.24 
Board power 
Job satisfaction 
Salaries-fringes 
6.63 
5.39 
7.31 
7.23 
5.42 
7.57 
2.05 
0.00 
0.29 
Instruction 5.53 6.24 1.77 
Teacher input 6.17 5.83 0.69 
Public opinion 3.92 3.80 0.04 
Working conditions 7.27 7.45 0.16 
Budget 4.90 5.20 0 . 2 6  
O 1 n t" *? 1 •? r*Ty/-> 1 ^rom av» +• ft 17 0 1 24* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 9. Tests for significant differences between groups of Iowa elementary teachers relative 
to their differences In number of years of teaching experience with respect to the 
actual instructional and noninstructlona1 outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
0-5 
years 
(n=24) 
6-10 
years 
(n=28) 
11-15 
years 
(n=30) 
16-20 
years 
(n=24) 
20+ 
years 
(n=41) 
F 
ratio 
Tea cher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.45 6.89 6.59 6.83 6.60 0.60 
Board power 7.52 7.24 7.10 7.44 7.13 0.63 
Job satisfaction 6.01 6.24 5.86 6.17 6.16 0.49 
Salaries-fringes 7.80 7.67 6.86 7.69 7.35 1.95 
Instruction 6.60 6.68 6.36 6.46 6.38 0.43 
Teacher input 6.59 6.38 6.22 6.20 6.19 0.54 
Public opinion 5.13 5.63 5.12 5.39 5.31 0.34 
Working condition» 7.71 7.68 7.33 7.81 7.46 0.57 
Budget 6.13 6.70 6.07 6.15 6.89 2.09 
Political involvement 7.94 8.45 8.08 8.32 8.45 0.65 
Table 10a, Teste for significant differences between groups of Iowa secondary teachers relative 
to their differences In number of years of teaching experience with respect to the 
actual instructional and noninstructlona1 outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Years of experience as a secondary teacher 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 20+ 
Scales years 
(n=38) 
years 
(n=36) 
years 
(n=29) 
years 
(n=22) 
years 
(n=33) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.46 7.01 6.28 6.66 6.35 2.71* 
Board power 7.39 7.18 7.14 7.38 7.19 0.39 
Job satisfaction 6.14 6.11 5.66 5.90 6.02 0.76 
Salaries-fringes 7.65 8.02 7.45 8.11 7.66 0.98 
Instruction 6.49 6.89 6.34 6.81 6.53 1.34 
Teacher input 6.11 6.52 6.05 6.51 6.27 1.27 
Public opinion 5.30 5.66 4.54 4.71 4.98 1.88 
Working condition# 7.80 8.05 7.66 8.36 7.52 1.77 
Budget 6.32 6.08 6.09 6.14 6.58 0,56 
Political Involvement 7.99 8.27 8.61 8.80 8.42 1.52 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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teachers were evident when years of teaching experience was used as the 
dependent variable on nine of the ten scales. On the scale Teacher/ 
Superintendent/Board Relations, there was a significant difference at 
the .05 level between the groups of secondary teachers relative to years 
of teaching experience. 
The Duncan Multiple Range test was used to ascertain which experi­
ence group means were significantly different. Group differences are 
reported in Table 10b. 
For the scale Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, secondary 
teachers with 6-10 years had a significantly different mean score than 
teachers in the other experience groups. 
Table 10b. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among 
secondary teachers on one scale with significant actual out­
come mean scores (secondary teachers with 0-5 years experience 
= Group 1; 6-10 years experience = Group 2; 11-15 years ex­
perience = Group 3; 16-20 years experience = Group 4; and 20 
or more years experience = Group 5) 
Scales Group means in ranges from smallest to largest^  
Teacher/superin­
tendent/board Group 3 Group 5 Group 1 Group 4 Group 2 
relations 6.28 6.35 6.46 6.66 7.01 
G^roup means not underscored by the same line are significantly 
different at the 0.05 level. Group means underscored by the same line 
are not significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
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Hypothesis Ninnber Four 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers rela­
tive to whether they are male or female. 
Tables 11 and 12 provide the results of analysis of variance used to 
test for significant differences in perceptions of Iowa elementary teach­
ers and Iowa secondary teachers. A highly significant difference at the 
.01 level between elementary teachers was noted for the Public Opinion 
scale. Female elementary teachers were more optimistic relative to the 
effects of collective bargaining on the Public Opinion and Teacher/ 
Superintendent/Board Relations scales than were their male counterparts. 
The null hypothesis was rejected for these two scales- There were no 
significant differences between male and female elementary teachers on 
the other eight scales. 
Similar differences were noted between male and female secondary 
teachers. Significant differences at the .05 level in the mean scores 
of secondary teachers were noted for the Job Satisfaction and Budget 
scales. Also, differences at the .01 level were reported for Teacher/ 
Superintendent/Board Relations and Public Opinion scales. Hence, the 
null hypothesis was rejected for the four scales. Since there were no 
significant differences noted on the other six scales, the null hypothe­
sis was not rejected for Board Power, Salaries-Fringes, Instruction, 
Teacher Input, Working Conditions, and Political Involvement. 
It is interesting to note that Iowa's female elementary and secon­
dary teachers appear to be more optimistic about the actual instructional 
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Table 11. Tests for significant differences among Iowa elementary 
teachers relative to their differences in sex with respect 
to the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome 
mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Sex of Iowa elementary teachers 
Male 
(n=20) 
Female 
(n=127) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.12 6.75 4.85* 
Board power 7.07 7.29 0.55 
Job satisfaction 5.64 6.16 3.43 
Salaries-fringes 7.04 7.50 1.73 
Instruction 
Teacher input 
6.14 
5.96 
6.53 
6.35 
1.94 
1.91 
ruoiic opinion D .4? 
Working conditions 7-53 7.58 0.03 
Budget 6.48 6.43 0.01 
Political involvement 8.36 8.25 0.09 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 12. Tests for significant differences among Iowa secondary 
teachers relative to their differences in sex with respect 
to the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome 
mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Sex of Iowa secondary teachers 
Male 
(n=99) 
Female 
(n=59 
F 
ratio 
T ea cher/superint endent/ 
board/relations 6.37 6.87 8.61** 
Board power 7.18 7.37 1.24 
Job satisfaction 5.84 6.24 3.95* 
Salaries-fringes 
Instruction 
7.70 
6.50 
7.87 
6.79 
0.49 
2.64 
Teacher input 6.27 6.31 0.04 
Public opinion 4.67 6 .81  14.88** 
Working conditions 
Budget 
7-72 
6.01  
8.07 
6.64 
2.79 
6.12* 
8.50 
«fir 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining than are their 
male colleagues. 
Hypothesis Number Five 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employ­
ment Relations Act among Iowa teachers relative to whether the 
financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary 
or secondary source of family income. 
The F-ratio derived from the analysis of variance was used to test 
for differences between the actual instructional and noninstructional 
outcome mean scores of teachers whose salary from teaching is a primary 
source of family income and those whose salary is a secondary source of 
family income. 
As noted in Table 13, there were no significant differences in 
mean scores at the .05 level on eight of the ten scales between teachers 
whose salary from teaching is a primary source of income and those 
teachers whose salary is a secondary source of family income. On those 
eight scales, the null hypothesis was not rejected. 
There were significant differences in mean scores at the .05 level 
on the scales for Public Opinion and Political Involvement. Thus on 
those two scales, Hypothesis Number Five was rejected. 
Hypothesis Number Six 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board mem­
bers in the study relative to whether or not the school district 
of which they are a part has a formal bargaining unit. 
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Table 13. Tests for significant differences between Iowa teachers rela­
tive to whether the financial remuneration they receive from 
teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income 
with respect to the actual instructional and noninstructional 
outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Teaching salary 
Primary source Secondary source 
of family income of family income 
(n=236) (n=68) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.60 6.65 0.12 
Board power 
Job satisfaction 
Salary-fringes 
7.27 
6.05 
7.66 
7.21 
5.99 
7.41 
0.15 
0.16 
1.56 
Instruction 6.54 6.58 0.08 
Teacher input 
Public opinion 
6.26 
5.09 
6.39 
5.59 
0.79 
3.93* 
Working conditions 
Budget 
7.76 
6.34 
7.58 
6.35 
0.96 
0.00 
Political involvement 8.41 8.01 4.08* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Iowa public school teachers in three hundred forty-six school dis­
tricts bargained collectively with their school boards under the provi­
sions of the Public Employment Relations Act during the 1981-82 school 
year. Teachers in only ninety-four Iowa public school districts did not 
bargain collectively under a certified bargaining unit. The teachers 
in nonbargaining districts chose means of resolving their conditions of 
employment other than those outlined in the Public Employment Relations 
Act. 
Analysis of variance was used to test for significant differences 
between the three groups surveyed. Mean responses and F-ratios among 
teachers from districts which bargain and those which do not bargain 
collectively are noted in Table 14. 
The null hypothesis was rejected on two of the actual outcome 
scales--Board Power and Teacher Input. Mean score differences were sig­
nificant at the .05 level on the Board Power scale and, more notably, 
at the .01 level on the Teacher Input scale. The null hypothesis could 
not be rejected on the actual outcome scales of Teacher/Superintendent/ 
Board Relations, Job Satisfaction, Salaries-Fringes, Instruction, Public 
Opinion, working Conditions, Budget, and Political Involvement, 
Table 15 provides the mean responses and F-values for each of the 
ten actual outccme scales between groups of Iowa superintendents from 
bargaining and nonbargaining districts. 
There were no significant differences at the .05 level in mean 
scores on any of the ten actual outcone scales between the two groups of 
superintendents. Hence, the data were such as to be unable to reject 
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Table 14. Tests for significant differences between Iowa teachers from 
bargaining and nonbargaining districts with respect to the 
actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores 
on the ten scales 
District has teacher bargaining unit certified by PERB 
Scales Yes 
(n=193) 
No 
(n=113) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.58 6.65 0.29 
Board power 7.38 7.05 6.10* 
Job satisfaction 6.01  6 .08  0.25 
Salaries-fringes 
Instruction 
7.66 
6.50 
7.52 
6 .62  
0.61 
0.73 
Teacher input 6.15 6.52 7.96** 
Public opinion 5.16 5.26 0.21 
Working conditions 
Budget 
7.71 
6.45 
7.73 
6.15 
0.03 
2.76 
Polit ica1 involvement « « DR c; n? 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
80 
Table 15. Tests for significant differences between Iowa superintendents 
from bargaining and nonbargaining districts with respect to 
the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on the ten scales 
District has teacher bargaining unit certified by PERB 
Scales 
Yes 
(n=45) 
No 
(n=2l) 
F 
ratio 
Tea cher/super intendent/ 
board relations 5.60 5,43 0.79 
Board power 6.93 6.78 0.39 
Job satisfaction 4.35 4.16 0.35 
Salaries-fringes 7.06 6.84 0.35 
Instruction 
Teacher input 
5.22 
5.72 
4.79 
5.61 
3.73 
0.23 
ruOiiC opiiijLOu 
Working conditions 7.98 7.88 0.12 
Budget 
Political involvement 
5.27 
9.38 
4.80 
9.79 
0.94 
1.56 
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null Hypothesis Number Six. Superintendents in districts with certified 
bargaining units observed the outcomes of collective bargaining very 
similar to those in districts without organized bargaining units. 
A number of significant differences in perceptions of Iowa board 
members from bargaining and nonbargaining districts are shown in Table 16. 
Significant differences at the .05 level were noted for the scales 
of Board Power and Job Satisfaction. Board members provided mean re­
sponses such that significant differences at the .01 level existed for 
the scales Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations and Instruction. For 
these four actual instructional and noninstructional outcome scales, 
the null hypothesis was rejected. The null hypothesis was not rejected 
for the remaining six scales. 
Hypothesis Number Seven 
There are no significant differences in the observed instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act among superintendents in the study relative to their 
differences in total years of experience as a school superintendent. 
Superintendents were evenly distributed in the five categories 
representing a wide range of years of experience in the superintendency. 
There was no significant difference at the .05 level on any of the ten 
scales between the mean scores of the groups of superintendents with 
varying lengths of superintendent experience. Thus, Hypothesis Number 
Seven could not be rejected on the ten scales (see Table 17). 
Regardless of the number of years experience in the superintendent's 
position, superintendents in the study perceived the actual instructional 
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Table 16. Tests for significant differences between Iowa board members 
from bargaining and nonbargaining districts with respect to 
the actual instructional and noninstructional outcome mean 
scores on the ten scales 
District has teacher bargaining unit certified by PERB 
Scales Yes 
(n=30) 
No 
(n=15) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superincendent/ 
board relations 6.48 5.40 13.79** 
Board power 6.97 6.04 5.15* 
Job satisfaction 5.41 4.44 6.28* 
Salaries-fringes 7.43 6.67 3.41 
Instruction 5.90 4.61 8,25** 
Teacher input 6 .00  5.66 0.87 
PnK 1 1 r nr* Î r* Î y 
Working conditions 7.38 6.86  1.86 
Budget 5.05 4.32 2.13 
Political involvement 8.67 8.01 2.12 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
** 
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 17. Tests for significant differences among Iowa superintendents relative to years of 
experience as a superintendent with respect to the actual instructional and non-
instructional outcOTie mean scores on the ten scales 
Years of experience as a superintendent 
Sea les 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 20+ 
years 
(n=17) 
years 
(n=13) 
years 
(n=13) 
years 
(n=9) 
years 
(n=13) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 5.73 5.50 5.35 5.18 5.67 1.96 
Board power 6.61 7.08 6,98 6.82 6.91 0.67 
Job satisfaction 4.19 4.37 4.63 4.15 4.02 0.49 
Salaries-fringes 6.50 7.32 7.35 7.18 6.71 0.98 
Instruction 4.85 5.25 4.94 5.59 4.96 1.37 
Teacher input 5.47 5.44 6.07 5.91 5.62 1,02 
Public opinion 2.92 2.75 2.74 3.11 3.14 0.21 
Working conditions 8.16 8.08 8.22 7.41 7.62 1.07 
Budget 5.13 5.31 4.58 5.17 5.38 0.35 
Political Involvement 9.32 9.69 9.69 8.67 10.02 1.60 
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and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining to be generally 
the same. 
Hypothesis Number Eight 
There are no differences between expected instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes expressed in 1977 and the actual, ob­
served instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act between the groups of Iowa ele­
mentary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents and board 
members. 
In the 1977 Else study (23), teachers, superintendents and board 
members responded to "expected outcome" statements on a five-point Likert 
scale. The respondents were asked to react to each expected outcome 
statement with "strongly agree", "agree", "neutral", "disagree", or 
"strongly disagree". All statements were categorized into ten scales: 
Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, 
Salaries-Fringes, Instruction, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, Working 
Conditions, Budget, and Political Involvement. 
The same ten scales were utilized in this study; however, respond­
ents were asked to react in a different manner. Participants were 
directed to Indicate their response to each item by first determining 
whether collective bargaining had improved (Increased) or diminished (de­
creased) the instructional or noninstructional condition posed. Respond­
ents then indicated how strongly they perceived collective bargaining 
had affected the condition by reacting to a five-point contingency scale. 
As a result of the increase/decrease modes, the contingency scale was 
expanded to eleven points with "6" meaning the condition had not been 
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affected by collective bargaining. 
The differences in the two respondent scales make a statistical 
comparison of the two studies impossible. However, a ccssparison of the 
results of the two studies may provide information relative to changes 
in the perceptions of teachers, superintendents, and board members re­
garding the instructional and noninstructional outcomes of collective 
bargaining. 
There were numerous similarities between the two studies on the 
tests for significant differences between the groups by position with re­
spect to the instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on 
each of the ten scales. In the 1977 study (23), the F-test for eight 
of the ten scales showed significant differences, at the .05 level or 
greater, in the long-range expected outcomes between the groups. Only 
on the scales. Teacher Input and Budget were there no significant dif­
ferences. The present study of actual outcomes of collective bargain­
ing found highly significant differences between the groups by position 
on all ten scales. 
A comparison of Duncan's Multiple Range Tests to determine which 
group means were significantly different for each study is shown in 
Table 18. When reading and interpreting Table 18, it must be remembered 
that the left-hand column represents the group which responded least 
favorably to the "expected" and "actual" instructional and noninstruc­
tional outcone statements for each scale. The far-right column repre­
sents the group which responded most favorably to the "expected" and 
"actual" outcome statements. On the scale Teacher/Superintendent/Board 
86 
Table 18. Comparison of Duncan's Multiple Range Tests to determine which 
group means were significantly different (Elementary Teachers 
= Group 1, Secondary Teachers = Group 2, Superintendents = 
Group 3, and Board Members = Group 4; for clarity in inter­
preting Table 18, refer to the explanation on page 85) 
Groups in ranges from negative to positive^ 
Scales 1977 study is shown on the first line 
of each scale and the present study 
is shown on the second line. 
Teacher/superintendent/ Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
board relations Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
Board power Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
Job satisfaction Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
Salaries-fringes Group 4 Group 1 Group 3 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Instruction Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Teacher input Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Public opinion Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
Working conditions Group 4 Group 1 Group 3 Group 2 
Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Budget Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
Political involvement Group 1 Group 2 Group 4 Group 3 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 4 Group 3 
^Group means underscored by the same line are not significantly dif­
ferent at the .05 level. Group means not underscored by the same line 
are significantly different at the .05 level. 
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Relations, in Table 18, for example, superintendents, in 1977, repre­
sented by group 3 on the first line, "expected" that Teacher/Superin­
tendent/Board Relations would not improve as a result of teacher col­
lective bargaining while secondary teachers felt most strongly that 
bargaining would improve relations. Superintendents in the present 
study, represented by group 3 on the second line, were least positive 
about the effects of collective bargaining on Teacher/Superintendent/ 
Board Relations while elementary teachers indicated to a greater extent 
than all other groups that collective bargaining had improved relations. 
For the scale Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, the "expected 
outcome" study found no significant difference at the .05 level between 
the groups of superintendents and board members nor between elementary 
teachers and secondary teachers. There was a significant difference in 
the mean scores at the .05 level between the subsets elementary-secondary 
teachers and superintendents-board members. The "actual outcome" study 
noted only slightly different findings. There was no significant differ­
ence at the .05 level between the groups of secondary teachers and ele­
mentary teachers, however, there were significant differences at the .05 
level between the means of the groups of superintendents, board members, 
and the subset of secondary teachers-elementary teachers. 
For the scale Board Power, the "expected outcome" study showed no 
significant difference at the .05 level between the groups of secondary 
teachers and elementary teachers, however, there were significant differ­
ences between the mean scores of the groups of superintendents, board 
members and the subset of secondary teachers-elementary teachers. Again, 
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the "actual outcome" study recorded a pattern that was only slightly 
different. There was no significant difference at the .05 level between 
the mean scores of the groups of board members and superintendents nor 
between secondary teachers and elementary teachers. There was a signif­
icant difference between the subsets board members-superintendents and 
secondary-elementary teachers. 
For the scale Job Satisfaction, the 1977 study revealed no signif­
icant difference at the .05 level between the groups of superintendents 
and board members. There were significant differences between the mean 
scores of the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers and the 
subset of superintendents-board members. The "actual outcome" study 
differed in that there was no significant difference at the .05 level 
between the groups of secondary and elementary teachers, however, there 
were significant differences between the groups of superintendents and 
board members and the subset secondary teachers-elementary teachers. 
For the scale Salary-Fringes, there were no significant differences 
at the .05 level between the groups of elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members in the "expected outccme" 
study. The "actual outcome" study found no significant differences at 
the .05 level in the means of the groups of superintendents and board 
members nor between the groups of elementary teachers and secondary 
teachers nor between the means of the groups of board members and ele­
mentary teachers. There was a significant difference at the .05 level 
between the means of subsets superintendents-board members, elementary 
teachers-secondary teachers, and board members-elementary teachers. 
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Greater similarities between the two studies were noted for the 
scale, Instruction. The "expected outcome" study showed no significant 
difference at the .05 level between the groups of superintendents and 
board members but did reveal significant differences between the mean 
scores of the groups of elementary teachers and secondary teachers and 
the subset of superintendents-board members. No significant differences 
were noted in the "actual outcome" study between the groups of superin­
tendents and board members nor between the groups of elementary teachers 
and secondary teachers. There was a significant difference in the mean 
scores at the .05 level between the subsets superintendents-board members 
and elementary teachers-secondary teachers. 
For the scale Teacher Input, the "expected outcome" study found no 
significant difference between the groups of superintendents, board mem­
bers, secondary teachers and elementary teachers. The "actual outcome" 
study found no significant difference at the .05 level between the mean 
scores of the groups of superintendents and board members nor between 
elementary teachers and secondary teachers. There was a significant 
difference at the .05 level between the subsets superintendents-board 
members and elementary teachers-secondary teachers. 
Of the ten scales, the greatest similarities in the two studies were 
revealed on the Public Opinion scale. In both studies, there was no 
significant difference at the .05 level between the mean scores of the 
groups of superintendents and board members nor between elementary and 
secondary teachers. However, in both studies there was a significant 
difference between the subsets of superintendents-board members and 
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elementary teachers-secondary teachers. 
For the scale Working Conditions, the "expected outcome" study 
showed no significant difference at the .05 level between the means of 
the groups of board members, elementary teachers and superintendents nor 
between the means of the groups of superintendents and secondary teach­
ers. There was a significant difference between the means of the sub­
sets board members-elementary teachers-superintendents and superinten­
dents-secondary teachers. Like the 1977 study, the "actual outcome" 
study found no significant difference at the .05 level between the mean 
scores of the groups of superintendents and elementary teachers. Al­
though unlike the first study, there also was no significant difference 
between the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, and super­
intendents. There was a significant difference at the .05 level between 
the mean scores of the subsets board members-elementary teachers and ele­
mentary teachers-secondary teachers-superintendents. 
For the scale Budget, the "expected outcome" study showed no signif­
icant differences at the .05 level in the means of the groups of board 
members, superintendents and secondary teachers nor between means of the 
groups of superintendents, secondary teachers, and elementary teachers. 
There was a significant difference at the .05 level between the means of 
the subset board members-superintendents-secondary teachers and subset 
superintendents-secondary teachers-elementary teachers. The "actual 
outcome" investigation found no significant difference at the .05 level 
between the groups of board members and superintendents nor between 
secondary teachers and elementary teachers. There was a significant 
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difference in the mean scores at the .05 level between the subsets of 
board members-superintendents and secondary teachers-elementary teachers. 
For the scale Political Involvement, there was no significant dif­
ference at the .05 level between the groups of elementary teachers and 
secondary teachers in the "expected outcome" study. However, there were 
significant differences in the mean scores at the .05 level between the 
groups of board members and superintendents and the subset elementary 
teachers-secondary teachers. The "actual outcome" study found no sig­
nificant difference at the .05 level between the groups of elementary 
teachers, secondary teachers, and board members but did reveal a signif­
icant difference in the mean scores at the .05 level between the group 
of superintendents and the subset of elementary teachers-secondary 
teachers-board members. 
As shown in Table 18, there were differences between the two studies 
on all scales except Public Opinion. Thus, the null hypothesis was re­
jected on nine of the ten scales. The null hypothesis was not rejected 
for the Public Opinion scale. 
It is interesting to note that elementary and secondary teachers 
were most optimistic about collective bargaining in their long-range 
expected outcomes five years ago and again in the present actual outcone 
study on seven of the ten scales. Most often when two of the groups did 
agree on their expectations and observations, it was the two groups of 
teachers agreeing and the superintendents and board members agreeing. 
Only on the scales of Salaries-Fringes, Working Conditions, and Political 
Involvement were the elementary and secondary teachers not the most 
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optimistic groups on both studies. 
Hypothesis Number Nine 
There are no significant differences in the degree of satis­
faction with final offer binding arbitration as an impasse proce­
dure in the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act as an alternative 
to strike between the groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members. 
The Iowa legislature became the first in the nation to pass a 
comprehensive collective bargaining act which required final offer bind­
ing arbitration for public school teachers as the final step for the 
resolution of impasses in their collective negotiations. Strikes are 
prohibited with strong sanctions provided in the event of an illegal 
work stoppage. Based on the number of settlements at each progressive 
step in the Iowa impasse procedure, binding arbitration has been highly 
successful. Satisfaction with binding arbitration between the four 
groups, however, is an entirely different question sought to be answered 
in this investigation. 
Analysis of variance was used to determine the significance of the 
differences in means between the groups on the questions relative to the 
degree of satisfaction with final offer binding arbitration. 
Table 19 shows the mean scores and F-ratios of each of the four 
groups for their responses to the statements dealing directly with final 
offer binding arbitration. 
On all of the statements there were significant differences at the 
.05 level or greater between the groups, therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected. 
Table 19. Tests for significant differences between the groups by position with respect to 
the actual outcome mean scores on each of the survey statements relative to satis­
faction with final offer binding arbitration 
Elementary Secondary Superin­ Board 
Survey statement teachers teachers tendents members F 
(n=lA7) (n=157) (n=65) (n=46) ratio 
Teacher collective bargain­
ing, as prescribed by the 
Iowa PERA, has increased/ 
decreased : 
the number of teachers, 8.43 8.03 7.38 7.20 4.79** 
the number of superintendents. 7.77 7.47 6.66 6.96 3.72* 
the number of board members. 8 . 0 2  7.54 6.94 7.63 3.22* 
. . . who view binding 
arbitration as a more satis­
factory means of solving 
differences than teacher 
strike. 
^Significant at the .05 level. 
'/<'k 
Significant at the .01 level. 
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The Duncan Multiple Range Test was used to determine which group 
means were significantly different. Group differences are reported in 
Table 20. 
Table 20. Duncan's Multiple Range Test to determine which group means 
are significantly different relative to satisfaction with 
final offer binding arbitration (Elementary teachers = Group 
1, Secondary teachers = Group 2, Superintendents = Group 3, 
and Board members = Group 4) 
Survey statement : 
Teacher collective bar­
gaining as prescribed Group means in ranges from smallest to largest 
by the Iowa PERA, has 
increased/decreased ; 
the number of teachers, Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
7.20 7.38 8.03 8.43 
the number of superinten- Group 3 Group 4 Group 2 Group 1 
dents, 6.66 6.96 7.47 7.77 
the number of board 
members. 6.94 
Group 3 Group 2 
/ .34-
Group 4 
/ .OJ 
Group 1 
8.02 
. . . who view binding 
arbitration as a more 
satisfactory means of 
solving differences than 
teacher strike. 
^Group means underscored by the same line are not significantly 
different at the .05 level. Group means not underscored by the same line 
are significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
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For the survey statement, "Teacher collective bargaining, as pre­
scribed by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has increased/ 
decreased the number of teachers who view binding arbitration as a more 
satisfactory means of solving differences than teacher strike," there 
was no significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the 
groups of board members, superintendents and secondary teachers nor 
between the means of the groups of secondary teachers and elementary 
teachers. There was a significant difference at the .05 level between 
the means of the subsets board members-superintendents-secondary teach­
ers and secondary teachers-elementary teachers-
For the survey statement, "Teacher collective bargaining as pre­
scribed by the Iowa PERA, has increased/decreased the number of superin­
tendents who view binding arbitration as a more satisfactory means of 
solving differences than teacher strike," there was no significant 
difference at the .05 level between the means of the groups of superin­
tendents and board members nor between the groups of board members, 
secondary teachers, and elementary teachers. However, there was a 
significant difference between the means of the subsets superintendents-
board members and board members-secondary teachers-elementary teachers. 
The statement that collective bargaining has increased/decreased 
the number of board members who view binding arbitration as more satis­
factory than teacher strike had slightly different results. There was no 
significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the groups 
of superintendents, secondary teachers, and board members nor between 
the groups of secondary teachers, board members, and elementary 
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teachers. There was a significant difference at the .05 level between 
the means of the subsets superintendents-secondary teachers-board mem­
bers and secondary teachers-board members-elementary teachers. 
It is interesting to note that elementary teachers are more 
optimistic in their perceptions of each group's degree of satisfaction 
with binding arbitration than the secondary teachers, superintendents, 
and board members. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nearly seventy-nine percent of the boards of education in Iowa's 
public school districts bargained collectively with teachers during the 
1981-82 school year. The percentage has slowly risen as teachers in 
school districts across the state voted for initiation of certified 
bargaining units. The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, which be­
came effective on July 1, 1975, provided the necessary framework for 
public school teachers to meet formally with school boards in determin­
ing salary, fringes, and working conditions and continues to lure 
teachers hoping to improve their situation. 
Seven years ago there was a great deal of speculation relative to 
the impact that collective bargaining would have on education. Teachers 
were quite convinced that collective bargaining would solve the problems 
of low pay, minimal fringe benefits, paternalistic administrators, and 
domineering boards of education. Administrators and board members, on 
the other hand, were equally certain that education would be destroyed 
and management's right to "run the schools" would be lost. 
All three groups worked diligently preparing their political game 
plans. The Iowa State Education Association through a network of uniserv 
units worked closely with local bargaining units in establishing bar­
gaining priorities while the Iowa Association of School Boards mounted an 
offensive to limit the scope of bargaining. 
After seven years, the dust appears to have settled. This investiga­
tion has provided data which indicate differences in attitudes among 
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the factions. However, the outcomes of collective bargaining have not 
come to rest at either of the extremes previously mentioned. Education 
has not crumbled under the strains of collective bargaining nor has the 
teachers' situation been greatly improved. 
A sample of 306 teachers, 66 superintendents, and 46 board members 
from Iowa responded to a questionnaire which was developed to determine 
differences, if any, in perceptions relating to the actual instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining. First, the 
study compared the attitudes of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents, and board members relative to actual outccmes of bargain­
ing. This study, then, attempted to determine differences, if any, in 
perceptions of actual instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
collective bargaining after seven years of bargaining with the expected 
instructional and noninstructional outcomes expressed in Else's 1977 
study. 
The questionnaire used to collect the data was a near replication 
of content developed for the 1977 study. However, the format was changed 
substantially to provide greater understanding of the direction in which 
collective bargaining was perceived to be headed. The revamped ques­
tionnaire was prompted by suggestions from Dr. Ross Engel and George 
Duvall, Iowa State Education Association president. The survey instru­
ment consisted of two major parts. The first section called for specific 
information pertaining to the respondent: grade level taught, sex, 
parent or nonparent, total number years of teaching experience, whether 
the financial remuneration received from teaching is a primary or 
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secondary source of family income, and whether time had been served as 
a member of the bargaining team at the bargaining table from the teacher 
respondents; years of experience as a superintendent from superintendent 
respondents; parent or nonparent and whether time had been served as a 
member of the bargaining team at the table from board member respondents; 
and whether the school district of which the respondent is a part has a 
certified teacher bargaining unit. The second and major portion of the 
questionnaire called for responses to seventy-seven "actual outcome" 
statements requiring a directional perception as to whether collective 
bargaining had improved (increased) or diminished (decreased) the in­
structional or noninstructional conditions posed, and an intensity judg­
ment was requested which expressed how strongly the respondents felt the 
conditions posed had been improved or diminished as a result of teacher 
collective bargaining. The seventy-seven "actual outcome" statements 
were grouped into ten scales as shown in Appendix D. The ten scales 
were Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfac­
tion, Salaries/Fringes, Instruction, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, Work­
ing Conditions, Budget, and Political Involvement. 
Since "actual outcome" statement content was nearly identical to 
"expected outcome" statements in the 1977 Else study (23), the grouping 
of the statements into scales was also nearly identical. A minimal num­
ber of "actual outcome" statements were added to the survey, and they 
were placed in scales with what appeared to be related statements. After 
data from the pilot study were analyzed, no changes in placement of 
statements into scales were made. 
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The statistical treatment of data used to test each of the null 
hypotheses was then applied to each of the scales relative to the various 
respondent groups. Respondent data collected were categorized into 
cells for statistical comparison according to school district size, re­
spondent's school role, whether a certified teacher bargaining unit 
existed in the respondent's district and the specific demographic charac­
teristics previously described. An analysis of variance was then con­
ducted, with the F-ratio being used to test the hypotheses. To determine 
which group means for each scale were significantly different from the 
other group means when comparisons between more than two groups were 
being made, Duncan's Multiple Range Test was used. 
Group mean scores and the F-ratios showing any existing differences 
between groups relative to their perceptions of the actual instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of teacher collective bargaining were re­
ported in tables. Score differences were reported using the .05 and 
.01 levels of statistical significance. 
In Chapters I and IV, the hypotheses in this investigation have 
been stated in the null form. For this summary, however, they are pre­
sented in the question form to enhance the layman's understanding. 
Question One 
Do Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superinten­
dents , and board members differ from each other in terms of what 
each group observes the outcomes of teacher collective bargaining 
to be after the first seven years of bargaining? 
Highly significant differences in the actual instructional and non-
instructional outcomes between the groups were shown by the F-test for 
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all ten scales. On the scale Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, 
there was no difference between elementary teachers and secondary teach­
ers relative to their observed outcomes of collective bargaining. Board 
members' perceptions differed significantly from those of the teachers. 
While teachers felt that Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations have im­
proved slightly as a result of bargaining, board members see very little 
effect on relations within the school since the inception of collective 
bargaining. Superintendents significantly disagreed with board members 
and teachers and were slightly negative in their view of the impact of 
collective bargaining on Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations. They 
felt relations have been diminished slightly in the bargaining process. 
Board members and superintendents indicated similar perceptions that 
the powers of boards of education in making decisions regarding the oper­
ation of schools has increased slightly as a result of collective bar­
gaining. Elementary and secondary teachers, on the other hand, tended 
to believe that board authority had increased to a significantly greater 
extent. 
The greatest differences occurred with the statements dealing with 
Job Satisfaction. Even though superintendents and board members differed 
significantly in their perceptions, both groups indicated that teacher 
collective bargaining had reduced job satisfaction for teachers and them­
selves. Elementary and secondary teachers were generally uncommitted 
and expressed that collective bargaining has had no effect on job satis­
faction. 
All four groups believed that salaries and fringes for teachers had 
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increased as a result of collective bargaining. Elementary and secondary 
teachers, however, had significantly stronger opinion on this issue 
than did superintendents and board members. It is interesting to note 
that all groups perceived increases in salary and fringes to be slight 
which is consistent with the literature. 
Both groups of teachers tended to agree that classroom instruction 
had improved slightly as a result of collective bargaining while super­
intendents and board members observing diminished classroom instruction, 
disagreed at a highly significant level as to how seriously it had been 
affected. 
Differences in actual outcomes relative to Teacher Input were highly 
significant. The elementary and secondary teachers agreed that collec­
tive bargaining has had little effect on the amount of input they have 
in the decision-making process. Superintendents and board members sug­
gested that collective bargaining had slightly decreased teacher input 
into administrative decisions. 
In general, all four groups agreed, that collective bargaining has 
had a detrimental effect upon the views that the public has of teaching 
as a profession, teachers' bargaining demands, and education in general. 
Superintendents and board members, however, had significantly stronger 
perceptions than teachers relative to the decline in public opinion 
toward teachers and public education since the onset of collective bar­
gaining. 
On the scale. Working Conditions, board members and elementary 
teachers were in agreement that collective bargaining has improved 
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working conditions for teachers. Secondary teachers and superintendents 
made significantly stronger observations that working conditions, 
for teachers, had improved because of collective bargaining. 
Board members and superintendents tended to agree that collective 
bargaining has decreased school districts' general fund carry-over 
balances. Elementary and secondary teachers felt public school budgets 
had not been affected by teacher collective bargaining. 
All four groups indicated that teacher collective bargaining had 
led to greater political involvement by the professional organizations 
representing all factions. However, superintendents' elicited response 
means illustrated significantly stronger perceptions regarding increased 
political involvement than did teachers or board members. 
Elementary and secondary teachers agreed in their perception of the 
actual outcomes of collective bargaining on all ten scales. Superinten­
dents and board members were somewhat less cohesive agreeing on six of 
the scales. There was disagreement on all ten scales and this occurred 
most often when the two groups of teachers disagreed with the superin­
tendents and board members. The answer to question one is "yes". 
Question Two 
Do Iowa public school teachers, superintendents, and board mem­
bers in twenty-five large atudent enrollment school districts ob­
serve different instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
teacher collective bargaining than do those in twenty-five small 
student enrollment districts? 
As of September, 1981, there were 440 public school districts in 
Iowa. One hundred twenty-seven of the public school districts in Iowa 
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had enrollments of 900 students or more. One hundred twenty-six public 
schools in Iowa had an enrollment of 400 or less. There were no signif­
icant differences between teachers in large districts and those in small 
districts on any of the ten scales. 
Both groups of teachers tended to agree that teacher collective 
bargaining has resulted in slight increases or improvements in Teacher/ 
Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Salaries-Fringes, and Work­
ing Conditions. Additionally, both groups of teachers felt quite 
strongly that collective bargaining had resulted in increased involve­
ment of teachers, superintendents, and board members in politics. 
Teachers in large and small Iowa school districts perceived collec­
tive bargaining as having no effect on job satisfaction, instruction, 
teacher input into the school district decision-making process, and 
school district budgets. 
Both groups agreed that teacher collective bargaining in Iowa has 
been detrimental to the image of teachers and education in general. 
However, the teachers felt that public opinion had diminished only 
slightly. Although teachers from large and small districts generally 
agreed in their perceptions of the actual instructional and noninstruc-
tional outcomes of collective bargaining, it is interesting to note that 
teachers from small districts were more optimistic, based on mean scores, 
on eight of the ten scales. 
Superintendents in Iowa's large and small public school districts 
agreed in their perceptions of the actual outcomes of collective bargain­
ing on nine of the ten scales. There was a significant difference on 
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only one scale--Political Involvement. 
Superintendents from both groups agreed that political involvement 
has increased greatly as a result of collective bargaining. However, 
superintendents from large districts observed a significantly greater 
increase than did their counterparts in small districts. 
All superintendents tended to believe that collective bargaining 
has slightly increased the board's authority, salaries and fringes, and 
improved working conditions. They also agreed that job satisfaction for 
teachers, superintendents and board members, the quality of instruction, 
and school budgets have decreased slightly. Superintendents expressed 
their opinion that public opinion of teachers and education has been 
adversely affected most by collective bargaining. Superintendents in 
both large and small districts felt that relationships between teachers, 
superintendents and board members, and teacher input had been diminished 
slightly by collective bargaining. 
Board members in large and small districts followed a pattern very 
similar to that of the superintendents agreeing on the actual instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining on nine of 
the ten scales. Board members fran large districts, like superintendents 
from large districts, felt significantly stronger about increased politi­
cal involvement than did board members and superintendents from small 
districts even though both groups of board members agreed that collec­
tive bargaining had greatly increased political involvement. 
According to both large and small district board members, board 
power, salaries and fringe benefits, and working conditions increased or 
106 
improved slightly as a result of collective bargaining while job satis­
faction and school district budgets decreased slightly. 
On the actual outcome statements relative to Teacher/Superintendent/ 
Board Relations, Instruction, and Teacher Input, board members from both 
groups felt collective bargaining had almost no effect. 
Like their executive officers, board members in large and small Iowa 
school districts believed that the public's opinion of teachers and 
education had been damaged most by collective bargaining. 
There were only a minimal number of differences in actual instruc­
tional and noninstructiona1 outcroies of collective bargaining between 
teachers, superintendents, and board members from large enrollment Iowa 
school districts and those from small enrollment school districts. Al­
though not significantly different, teachers in small districts gener­
ally felt more positive about the effects of collective bargaining than 
did teachers in large districts. Large school district superintendents 
and board members felt that political involvement of teachers, superin­
tendents, and board members had increased significantly more than did 
their counterparts in small districts. 
Teachers in large districts agreed with teachers in small districts 
on all ten scales. Superintendents and board members in large districts 
agreed with their counterparts on all but one scale--Political Involve­
ment. Thus, generally, the answer to question two is "no". 
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Question Three 
Do Iowa's elementary and secondary teachers observe different 
outcomes of teacher collective bargaining relative to their years 
of teaching experience? 
Five experience groups with a range of five years each were used to 
subdivide the two groups of Iowa elementary and secondary teachers. The 
experience groups were made up of teachers with 0-5 years of teaching 
experience, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of experience, 16-20 
years of experience, and 20 or more years of experience. 
When comparisons were made between elementary teachers in the five 
experience groups, no significant differences were noted. Nor was there 
a distinct pattern of one experience group observing more positive or 
negative outcomes of teacher collective bargaining than any other ex­
perience group. 
Secondary teachers in the five experience groups agreed in their 
perceptions of the actual instructional and noninstructional outcomes of 
collective bargaining on nine of the ten scales. On the scale Teacher/ 
Superintendent/Board Relations, secondary teachers with 6-10 years of 
teacher experience felt that collective bargaining had significantly 
improved relations. 
The answer to question three is generally "no". 
Question Four 
Are there significant differences in the observed instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Rela­
tions Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to 
whether they are male or female? 
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A significant difference between male and female elementary teachers 
was noted in testing the mean responses for two of the ten instructional 
and noninstructional scales. 
Female elementary teachers indicated a slight improvement in rela­
tions between teacher, superintendents and board members while their male 
counterparts observed teacher collective bargaining as having no effect 
on teacher, superintendent and board member relations. 
Female elementary teachers indicated a slight decrease in public 
opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education in general. 
Male elementary teachers were more inclined to believe that collective 
bargaining had decreased public opinion to a significantly greater ex­
tent . 
On the remaining eight scales there were no significant differences 
between male and female mean responses to the actual instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining. However, female ele­
mentary teachers were slightly more positive in their perceptions of the 
outcomes of collective bargaining. 
Secondary female and male teachers responded significantly different 
on four of the ten scales. Female teachers observed slight improvements 
in Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations, Public Opinion and Budget 
while their male colleagues generally felt that collective bargaining 
had little effect on Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations and Budget, 
but had decreased public opinion of teachers' bargaining demands and edu­
cation in general. Neither group of secondary teachers felt that collec­
tive bargaining had an effect on job satisfaction of teachers. 
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superintendents and board members, however, female secondary teachers 
were significantly more positive in their observations. 
There were no significant differences on the actual outcome state­
ments making up the remaining six scales. However, like female elemen­
tary teachers, the secondary female teachers were generally more positive 
in their perceptions of the actual outcomes of collective bargaining 
than their male colleagues. 
Generally, the answer to question four is "yes". 
Question Five 
Are there significant differences in the observed instructional 
and noninstructional outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among 
Iowa teachers relative to whether the financial remuneration they 
receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family 
income? 
Comparisons among groups of teachers relative to source of family 
income revealed significant differences on two of the actual outcome 
scales. 
On the actual outcome statements relative to public opinion, both 
groups of teachers indicated that they believed the effect of teacher 
collective bargaining on public opinion has been negative. Teachers 
whose financial remuneration received from teaching was a primary source 
of family income indicated to a significantly greater extent than their 
colleagues, whose financial remuneration was a secondary source of in­
come, that collective bargaining had diminished the public's opinion of 
teachers' demands and education in general. 
Seventy-eight percent of the teachers reponding to the survey said 
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that teaching was a primary source of family income. This group felt 
that political involvement of teachers, superintendents, and board mem­
bers had increased to a significantly greater extent than did those 
teachers who indicated that their teaching salary was a secondary source 
of family income. 
The source of family income variable did not account for signifi­
cant differences among teachers on any other scales. The study did not 
yield any pattern of differences between teachers whose salaries were 
a primary source of family income and those who responded their salary 
was a secondary source of family income. However, because of the sig­
nificant differences on the scales of Public Opinion and Political In­
volvement, the answer to question five is "yes". 
Question Six 
Are there differences in the observed instructional and non-
instructional outcomes of collective bargaining among Iowa teachers, 
superintendents, and board members in bargaining districts and 
those in nonbargaining districts? 
Teacher respondents in this study were from twenty-five large dis­
tricts and twenty-five small districts all of which bargain collectively 
and twenty-five school districts of varying size that do not bargain 
collectively. The perceptions of teachers in districts with certified 
bargaining units were compared with the perceptions of those in nonbar­
gaining districts. 
Teachers from districts that bargain collectively observed an in­
crease in the board's of education power to a'significantly greater 
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extent than did teachers in nonbargaining districts. Bargaining teach­
ers also tended to believe that collective bargaining had no effect on 
teacher input into the decision-making process in their districts. This 
was even more significantly different from teachers in nonbargaining 
districts who felt that teacher input had been increased slightly. 
These two findings would indicate that boards of education in bargaining 
districts have emphasized their rights to "run the schools" and set edu­
cational policy, without input from teachers, while nonbargaining boards, 
perhaps in an effort to forego the rigors of bargaining have given the 
teachers a greater voice in the operation of the school. 
Although there were no significant differences on the eight re­
maining actual instructional and noninstructional outcome scales, mean 
score responses from nonbargaining teachers were slightly more positive 
than those from bargaining teachers on five of the scales. 
Although there were no significant differences in the observed out­
comes of teacher collective bargaining between superintendents in bargain­
ing districts and those in nonbargaining districts, superintendents in 
nonbargaining districts were generally more negative in their view of 
collective bargaining outcomes. 
Nonbargaining superintendents viewed a more adversary relationship 
between teachers, superintendents and board members, a greater decline 
in the quality of classroom instruction, a more direct effect on school 
district budgets, and a more significant increase in political involve­
ment as a result of collective bargaining. 
Board members from districts with formal bargaining units and those 
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from districts without certified bargaining units disagreed more sig­
nificantly in their perceptions of the actual outcomes of bargaining 
than did the groups of superintendents and teachers. Significant dif­
ferences among the board members were noted in the areas of job satis­
faction and board power. Highly significant differences in observed 
outcomes were indicated in the areas of teacher, superintendent, and 
board member relations, and classroom instruction. 
Board members from districts absent certified bargaining units be­
lieved that job satisfaction for teachers, superintendents, and board 
members had diminished to a significantly greater extent than board mem­
bers in districts with certified bargaining units. 
Similarly, board members in nonbargaining districts felt collec­
tive bargaining had virtually no effect on the board's power while their 
counterparts in bargaining districts saw a slight increase in board 
power. 
Board members in bargaining districts observed a very slight im­
provement in teacher, superintendent, board member relations as a result 
of teacher collective bargaining. The same relations were perceived as 
being slightly diminished as a result of teacher collective bargaining 
by board members in nonbargaining districts. 
Classroom instruction in districts that bargain collectively was 
perceived as being diminished by board members in nonbargaining districts. 
A significantly more neutral position was indicated by bargaining dis­
trict board members. 
There were only slight differences in the mean responses among the 
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board members on the scales of Salaries-Fringes, Teacher Input, Public 
Opinion, Working Conditions, Budget, and Political Involvement. However, 
it should be noted that board members from bargaining districts were 
less negative about the actual outcomes of collective bargaining than 
were board members from nonbargaining districts on all scales except 
Political Involvement. 
The answer to question six among teachers from bargaining and non-
bargaining districts is "yes". However, the answer among superintendents 
is "no". The greatest differences in responses to the actual instruc­
tional and noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining were re­
corded by board members resulting in a definite "yes" answer to ques­
tion six. 
Question Seven 
Are there differences in the observed instructional and non-
instructional outcomes of collective bargaining among Iowa super­
intendents relative to their differences in years of experience as 
a school superintendent? 
Superintendents in the study were divided into five experience 
groups similar to the teacher experience groups. The experience groups 
were made up of superintendents with 0-5 years of superintendency experi­
ence, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of experience, 16-20 years 
of experience, and 20 cr more years of experience. 
When comparisons of actual outcome responses were made among the 
superintendents in the five experience groups, no significant differences 
were noted. Superintendents tended to be in close agreement on all ten 
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actual outcome scales. 
The answer to question seven is "no". 
Question Eight 
Has there been a shift in the perceived outcomes of collec­
tive bargaining among Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, 
superintendents, and board members since 1977. 
It has been seven years since Iowa public school teachers first 
bargained collectively with their boards of education. Two years after 
teacher collective bargaining began, Harlan Else conducted an investiga­
tion of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, 
and board members to determine the expected instructional and noninstruc-
tional outcomes of collective bargaining. Dr. Else's study (23) was 
nearly replicated in this study with the exception of the questionnaire's 
respondent scale which was revised to provide a more precise analysis 
as to whether collective bargaining had improved (increased) or dimin­
ished (decreased) the instructional and noninstructional conditions 
posed. The revision in the respondent scale, discussed in Chapter IV, 
made a statistical comparison of the two studies impossible. However, 
question eight is presented to determine if there has been a shift in the 
outlook of the four groups and if the groups which agreed or disagreed 
..re.la.tive to the expected outcomes in 1977 tend to also agree or disagree 
relative to actual outcomes of teacher collective bargaining. In order 
to make a comparison, the general conclusions, based on statistical anal­
ysis of the 1977 study were compared to the general conclusions, derived 
from the statistical analysis in this investigation. 
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Generally, the two studies noted similarities in the responses to 
expected and actual outcome statements when comparisons were made among 
elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents and board 
members. 
Elementary and secondary teachers responded in a more positive man­
ner relative to the expected and actual outcome statements on seven of 
the ten scales. 
In the "expected outcome" study, the two groups of teachers felt 
more positive toward the concept that teacher collective bargaining 
would improve Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations while superinten­
dents and board members disagreed. Similar conclusions were noted in 
the "actual outcome" investigation. Elementary and secondary teachers 
felt that working relations between teachers, superintendents, and 
boards of education have improved slightly as a result of collective 
bargaining. Board members observed very little change in working rela­
tions, thus, disagreeing significantly from the two groups of teachers. 
Superintendents disagreed further by indicating that Teacher/Superinten­
dent/Board Relations had diminished slightly due to collective bargain­
ing. 
Again, the two groups of teachers responded most positively about 
Board Power in both studies. The teachers in 1977 were of the opinion 
that collective bargaining would diminish board authority only slightly. 
Teachers in the present study, however, observed a slight increase in 
board power. Board members in 1977 were convinced that collective bar­
gaining would diminish board authority and superintendents were even 
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more adamant about the detrimental effects of bargaining on board power. 
The "actual outcome" study revealed an attitudinal shift in the percep­
tions of teachers, superintendents, and board members. Superintendents 
and board members were still in disagreement with elementary and secon­
dary teachers and they continued to be less positive about the effects 
of collective bargaining on board authority. However, while teachers, 
superintendents, and board members in 1977 expected board authority to 
diminish as a result of collective bargaining, all groups in 1982 ob­
served a slight increase in Board Power. 
When considering job satisfaction, superintendents and board mem­
bers differed significantly from teachers in both studies. However, 
there was a noticeable change in the teachers' perceptions from 1977 to 
1982. Secondary teachers in the "expected outcome" study felt more 
strongly than elementary teachers that collective bargaining would have 
a positive effect on job satisfaction for teachers, superintendents, and 
board members. In the present study, both groups of teachers tended to 
believe that collective bargaining has had no effect on job satisfaction 
for themselves or superintendents and board members. Like their col­
leagues in the earlier study who expected collective bargaining to re­
duce job satisfaction, superintendents and board members in the present 
study perceived that collective bargaining had actually diminished job 
satisfaction for teachers, superintendents and board members. 
Elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board 
members agreed in their expectations that collective bargaining would 
increase salaries and fringe benefits for teachers. Although the groups 
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did not disagree significantly, elementary teachers and board members 
were less positive that salaries and fringe benefits would increase. 
Teachers, superintendents, and board members indicated they had observed 
a slight increase in teachers' salaries and fringe benefits as a result 
of collective bargaining since the inception of bargaining seven years 
ago. There is significant disagreement relative to the increase in 
salaries and fringe benefits with elementary and secondary teachers more 
positive in their perceptions than superintendents and board members. 
Elementary and secondary teachers in 1977 believed that collective 
bargaining would improve classroom instruction. Superintendents and 
board members disagreed at a highly significant level. Similar observa­
tions were made in 1982. Elementary and secondary teachers tended to 
believe that collective bargaining had slightly improved classroom in­
struction while superintendents and board members significantly disagreed 
with the two teacher groups by indicating that classroom instruction had 
been diminished as an outcome of collective bargaining. 
Teachers, superintendents, and board members were neutral and agreed 
in their "expected outcomes" of collective bargaining on teacher input. 
Although their counterparts "actually" observed almost no effect of 
collective bargaining on teacher input into the decision-making process, 
elementary and secondary teachers were significantly more positive than 
superintendents and board members. 
Superintendents and board members in 1977 expected that collective 
bargaining would have a long-range negative effect upon the views that 
the public had of teachers and education in general. Both groups of 
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teachers did not agree with the superintendents and board members and 
indicated that collective bargaining would not have a long-range detri­
mental effect on the esteem with which the public viewed teachers and 
the education process. The "actual outcome" study revealed somewhat 
different conclusions. While superintendents and board members agreed 
that collective bargaining had diminished public opinion of teachers and 
education, teachers also noted a decline in the public's view even 
though it was felt to be significantly less negative than that perceived 
by the superintendents and board members. 
Five years ago, all four groups expected working conditions for 
teachers to improve as a result of collective bargaining. However, 
superintendents and secondary teachers were significantly more positive 
than board members and elementary t eachers that working conditions 
would improve. The only shift in the "actual outcome" study was that 
superintendents were even more convinced than secondary teachers that 
collective bargaining had improved working conditions. Board members 
and elementary teachers, even though agreeing that collective bargain­
ing had improved working conditions, were again significantly less 
positive than the secondary teachers and superintendents. 
On the scale. Budget, elementary and secondary teachers in both 
studies were more positive than the superintendents and board members. 
Superintendents and board members in the studies indicated that budgets 
would be and had been detrimentally affected by collective bargaining. 
All four groups in the "expected outcone" study believed that col­
lective bargaining would lead to greater political involvement by 
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teachers, superintendents, and board members. However, the teachers 
did not feel as strongly about increased political involvement as did 
superintendents and board members. Elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members in the present study gener­
ally agreed with their counterparts in the earlier study. Superinten­
dents and board members indicated significantly stronger involvement 
politically, by all groups, than did elementary and secondary teachers, 
which is consistent with the 1977 investigation. 
Like the first study, the groups of respondents in this study did 
differ in their perceived actual outcomes of collective bargaining. And 
like the first study, most often when two groups did agree on actual 
outcomes, it was the superintendents and board members agreeing and the 
two groups of teachers agreeing. However, there has also been some 
shift in what teachers, superintendents and board members expected the 
long-range outcomes of collective bargaining to be and what they now 
perceive. 
Additionally, there have been noteworthy shifts in the expected 
outcomes and actual outcomes perceived by teachers, superintendents, and 
board members when the variables of district size, teacher sex, and 
whether the district had a certified bargaining unit were considered. 
As noted earlier, teachers from small districts were more optimis­
tic than teachers from large districts in their perceptions of the 
"actual" instructional and noninstructional outccmes of collective bar­
gaining. This is a reversal of results expressed in Else's 1977 study 
(23) in which large school district teachers were more optimistic about 
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the "expected" outcomes of collective bargaining than small school 
district teachers. 
Female elementary and secondary teachers were generally more posi­
tive in their perceptions of the "actual" instructional and nonin-
structional outcomes of collective bargaining than their male colleagues. 
This finding differed from Else's 1977 study (23) in which there were 
no differences in the "expected" outcomes of teacher collective bargain­
ing between male and female teachers among either elementary or secon­
dary teachers. 
Nonbargaining teachers in 1977 believed that job satisfaction would 
be improved as a result of collective bargaining. In this investigation, 
nonbargaining teachers felt collective bargaining has had virtually no 
effect on job satisfaction. Generally, there was less disagreement on 
the actual outcomes of 'collective bargaining between bargaining and non-
bargaining teachers in 1982 than there was between the two groups of 
teachers on expected outcomes in 1977. 
Bargaining superintendents in 1977 tended to believe more than non-
bargaining superintendents that Teacher/Superintendent/Board Relations 
would be adversely affected, that the quality of classroom instruction 
would not improve, that budgets would be affected more directly, and that 
political involvement of teachers, superintendents, and board members 
would increase, all as a result of teacher collective bargaining. The 
actual outcome perceptions of the two groups of superintendents on the 
same four scales reversed in this study. It was the nonbargaining 
superintendents who viewed a more adverse relationship between teachers. 
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superintendents, and board members, a greater decline in the quality of 
classroom instruction, a more direct effect on school district budgets, 
and a more significant increase in political involvement as a result of 
collective bargaining. 
There also were some shifts in the perceptions of board members in 
1977 to those of board members in 1982. Board members from bargaining 
and nonbargaining districts in Else's 1977 study (23) were in closer 
agreement on the ten scales than the two groups of board members in the 
present study. While board members from bargaining districts in 1977 
were neither more positive nor negative than their counterparts in non-
bargaining districts on expected outcomes of collective bargaining, 
board members from bargaining districts in 1982 were more positive about 
the actual outcomes of collective bargaining than were board members from 
nonbargaining districts on all scales except political involvement. 
Question Nine 
Are there differences in the degree of satisfaction with final 
offer binding arbitration as an impasse procedure in the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act as an alternative to strike among Iowa ele­
mentary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board 
members ? 
An extensive review of literature relative to the advantages and 
disadvantages of final offer binding arbitration used in Iowa was dis­
cussed in Chapter II. Much of the literature (16, 27, 28, 40, 42, 51) 
reviewed contended that binding arbitration has been an effective 
alternative to strike in providing balance of bargaining power to en­
sure good faith negotiations. 
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It was also noted, however, that there is opposition (5, 73) to 
final offer binding arbitration. This study tried to determine the per­
ceptions of Iowa teachers, superintendents and board members relative 
to their satisfaction with final offer binding arbitration as prescribed 
by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, 
The first question on the survey relative to final offer binding 
arbitration asked whether collective bargaining had increased or de­
creased the number of teachers who view binding arbitration as a more 
satisfactory means of solving differences than teacher strike. The 
four groups of respondents disagreed at a highly significant level. 
Board members and superintendents agreed that teacher collective bargain­
ing had increased the number of teachers who view binding arbitration 
as a more satisfactory means of solving differences than teacher strike. 
Elementary and secondary teachers tended to believe that there was a 
significantly greater number of teachers satisfied with binding arbitra­
tion as prescribed by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act than did 
the superintendents and board members. 
When the question was asked about the number of superintendents 
satisfied with binding arbitration, all four groups responded less posi­
tively. Superintendents were least positive about the increase in the 
numbers of themselves who view binding arbitration as a more satisfac­
tory means of solving differences than teacher strike. They felt that 
the number of superintendents more satisfied with binding arbitration 
rather than teacher strike had increased only very slightly. Board mem­
bers generally agreed with the superintendents, but were slightly more 
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positive relative to their chief executives' satisfaction with binding 
arbitration opposed to teacher strike. Secondary and elementary teach­
ers felt that collective bargaining had increased the number of super­
intendents satisfied with final offer binding arbitration to signifi­
cantly greater extent than did superintendents and board members. 
Board members tended to believe that the number of their colleagues 
satisfied with binding arbitration was growing. Only elementary teachers 
indicated that the number of board members satisfied with binding arbi­
tration opposed to teacher strike had increased to a greater extent. 
Superintendents were least inclined to believe that the number of board 
members satisfied with binding arbitration had increased. 
This survey revealed that the number of teachers, superintendents, 
and board members satisfied with binding arbitration as an alternative 
to teacher strike is increasing at least slightly. This may possibly 
be interpreted to mean that there is a degree of satisfaction with bind­
ing arbitration among all four groups even though it may be slight. 
However, it should also be noted, that there is a difference in the de­
gree of satisfaction among the groups of elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents and board members. It is also interesting 
that the two groups of teachers were most positive about the increased 
number of their colleagues, superintendents, and board members satisfied 
with final offer binding arbitration as prescribed by the Iowa Public 
Employment Relations Act. 
The answer to question number nine is "yes". 
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Limitations 
This study investigated the actual instructional and noninstruc-
tional outcomes of teacher collective bargaining as viewed by elemen­
tary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members 
in the public schools of Iowa seven years after implementation of the 
Public Employment Relations Act. In addition, it compared, in general 
terms, the "actual" instructional and noninstructional outcomes with the 
"expected" instructional and noninstructional outccmes expressed by 
teachers, superintendents, and board members in 1977. 
1. The study included samples of elementary teachers, secondary 
teachers, superintendents, and board members from public school dis­
tricts in Iowa. It did not include building principals or assistant 
principals who directly administer the master contract. Attitudes of 
these latter two groups are not included in the study even though they 
may have some of the best perceptions of the outcomes of collective 
bargaining. 
2. Comments on some of the returned pilot study survey forms in­
dicated that teacher collective bargaining might be a highly emotional 
issue. The conclusions of this investigation are based on somewhat 
less than objective data since the respondents in all likelihood com­
pleted the questionnaires on the basis of personal values. However, 
in view of this, the reader is invited to reread the definitions in 
Chapter I on page 5. 
3. It was not determined to what extent the respondents from 
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bargaining districts differed in terms of their knowledge of or direct 
experience with teacher collective bargaining prior to completing the 
questionnaire. Respondents from nonbargaining districts were asked the 
number of years experience they had in a bargaining district, and it 
was found that less than six percent had served more than three years 
in bargaining districts. No other attempt was made to determine the 
amount of previous education or experience a respondent may have had 
prior to answering the questionnaire. However, it was assumed that all 
respondents had observed the outcomes of teacher collective bargaining 
in Iowa. Actually, this is not so much a limitation as it is an attempt 
to provide some perspective for the reader. 
Discussion 
In 1968, Borger (6) reported that over 80 percent of the board mem­
bers and over 85 percent of the superintendents surveyed in Iowa agreed 
that teachers should have the right to bargain collectively with their 
school boards. Nine years after Borger's study and two years after the 
implementation of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa, Else (23) found 
that superintendents and board members believed that collective bargain­
ing would have generally detrimental long-range effects on education. 
This investigation suggests that perceptions of elementary teachers, 
secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members relative to the 
effects of teacher collective bargaining on education have shifted very 
little and are generally consistent with the findings reported by Else 
in 1977. Superintendents and board members tend to believe that 
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collective bargaining generally is detrimental to education. Teachers 
for the most part feel that collective bargaining has been beneficial 
to education as they suggested it would be in their long-range expec­
tations. It is notable that teachers have shifted their once positive 
expectations to neutral or negative observations in the areas of job 
satisfaction and public opinion. 
One of the most interesting findings in this study was the revela­
tion that the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, super­
intendents, and board members felt board of education power had been in­
creased as a result of teacher collective bargaining. It has been sug­
gested that the paternalism of boards of education prior to collective 
bargaining contributed to the move toward and eventual implementation 
of the Public Employment Relations Act. If this contention is true, 
then it appears that the board's "free hand" teachers hoped to escape 
through bargaining has been strengthened through the same process. While 
boards of education may be willing to provide slightly better salaries 
and fringe benefits, it appears they are not at all willing to give up 
their authority. 
A review of related literature indicates that collective bargaining 
has had minimal positive effects on teacher salaries and fringe benefits. 
This study reaffirmed the results of several studies mentioned in the 
Review of Literature. All four groups of school people studied responded 
that there had been a slight increase in teacher salaries and fringe 
benefits attributable to collective bargaining. It may be unfair to 
imply that collective bargaining really hasn't had a significant impact 
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on teachers' salaries and fringe benefits. The economic plight of 
public schools in Iowa was discussed in Chapter II and certainly may 
account, at least in part, for the relatively slight increases in sal­
aries and fringes for teachers. What these might have been in a period 
of greater affluence is difficult to predict. 
It has often been suggested that people fear the unknown and that 
conditions may appear considerably worse to someone who is not directly 
involved in a highly emotional issue. This investigation provides sup­
port for such contentions. Superintendents and board members from school 
districts absent certified bargaining units felt that collective bargain­
ing was more detrimental to education than their counterparts from bar­
gaining districts. 
At a time when public education is attacked for a variety of per­
ceived ills, teacher collective bargaining, as observed by respondents in 
this study, has laced public opinion with further discontent with teach­
ers and public education. How this will affect students and their atti­
tudes toward public education is yet to be seen. And just what role 
collective bargaining has had in the steady decline of Iowa public 
school enrollments while private schools have shown steady increases in 
student enrollment was not addressed in this study. Both of these 
questions suggest further attention. 
Teacher collective bargaining in Iowa was bom in the midst of 
strong political debate. The political machinery has gained momentum as 
the teachers' association has pushed for an expansion of mandatory 
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subjects of bargaining while board member and administrator associa­
tions have resisted any additions to the bargaining "laundry list". Re­
spondents in this investigation observed a greater increase in political 
involvement, as a result of collective bargaining, than any other in­
structional or noninstructional outcome studied. 
The Iowa legislature was a national leader in making final offer 
binding arbitration a part of the Public Employment Relations Act. Lit­
erature reviewed in Chapter II strongly supports the concept of final 
offer binding arbitration as a positive alternative to teacher strike. 
Respondents in this investigation generally concurred that bargaining as 
prescribed by the Iowa PEEA has increased the number of teachers, super­
intendents, and board members who view binding arbitration as a more 
satisfactory means of solving differences than teacher strike. 
Few would argue that teacher collective bargaining has had no 
effect on public education in Iowa. In 1977, Else stated (23) that 
"collective bargaining may be a 'Fairy Godmother' or a 'Boogey Man' 
depending upon individual perceptions affected more by job role than by 
factual data." This investigation suggests that it may be neither. In­
structional and noninstructional conditions posed, with the exception 
of public opinion and political involvement previously discussed, have 
been altered only slightly, if at all, as a result of teacher collective 
bargaining. However, additional legislative intervention into collec­
tive bargaining and the impasse procedure that alienates teachers from 
boards of education may further erode the public's opinion of education, 
A cooperative thrust by all school people is needed if public confidence 
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is to be restored in public education. 
It is important that the reader be cautious in drawing conclusions 
from the results of this study. The present conditions of society rela­
tive to declining enrollments, economics, the public's demands for 
accountability in the schools, etc., may influence a person's percep­
tions relative to the outcomes of collective bargaining. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
1. Differences in observed outcomes between superintendents and 
board members from bargaining and nonbargaining districts 
should be studied to determine whether the differences indicated 
in this study were due to a "mellowing effect" of superinten­
dents and board members in bargaining districts or whether the 
differences were due to knowledge and direct experience with 
collective bargaining. 
2. A study, similar to this study, should be conducted in Iowa to 
determine the public's opinion of the actual instructional and 
noninstructional outcomes of collective bargaining. 
3. A longitudinal study of male and female secondary teachers 
should be conducted to determine if male secondary teachers 
will continue to express less positive attitudes toward the out­
comes of collective bargaining and if such perceptions will or 
are causing them to explore other career opportunities. 
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SURVEY 
Iowa public school teachers in three hundred forty-six (346) school 
districts now bargain collectively under the provisions of the Public 
Employment Relations Act. The purpose of this questionnaire is to 
determine your perceptions of the actual outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining in Iowa. 
I. Please check the appropriate responses: 
A. Does your school district have a teacher bargaining unit certified 
by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB)? 
yes no 
B. Answer only if your response in A was "no." 
Since you are not presently in a school district which bargains 
collectively, indicate your total years of previous experience in 
districts which bargained collectively. 
never in a bargaining district; 0-2 years; 3 years 
or more 
C. Your position: (check one) 
Elementary (K-6) teacher; Secondary (7-12) teacher; 
Superintendent; Board Member. 
D. If you are a board member or teacher, indicate whether or not you 
are a parent. 
parent nonparent 
E. If a superintendent, indicate total years of experience =s s 
superintendent. 
0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more chan 20 
F- If an elementary or secondary teacher, answer the following; 
1. Total years of teaching experience; 
0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more than 20 
2. Sex: male; female 
3. Is your salary frcxn teaching a primary source of family 
income ? 
yes no 
G. Board member or teacher answer only. Have you served as a member 
of the bargaining team at the bargaining table? 
yes no 
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Directions : Indicate your response to each item by first determining 
whether collective bargaining has improved (increased) or diminished 
(decreased) the instructional or noninstructional condition posed. If 
the condition has improved (increased) as a result of collective bargain­
ing, circle "I". If the condition has diminished (decreased) as a result 
of collective bargaining, circle "D". Now indicate how strongly collec­
tive bargaining has affected the item by placing a check in the box to 
the right which best describes your assessment of the condition. A check 
(•) in box number "1" indicates a slight affect, "5" indicates a strong 
affect. Remember these are your perceptions. If you are in a nonbar-
gaining district, indicate how you perceive collective bargaining has 
affected items posed in bargaining districts. 
Please be sure to circle a letter and check a number after each statement, 
unless you are completely undecided whether collective bargaining has had 
any effect (no change) on the issue. In that case, circle both "I" and 
"D", but do not check any of the numbers. 
The improved/diminished mode will be used in numbers 1-32; the increased/ 
decreased mode will be used in numbers 33-77. 
Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has improved/ 
diminished : 
Circle One Check One (y) 
u M C 
60 o 
•H k 
JJ W w 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. . . . teacher-administrator-board relationships. I 
D 
2. . . . the way in which teachers and school boards- 1 
administrators work on matters of mutual concern. D 
3. . . . the school board's right to determine educa- I 
tional policies. D 
4. . . . the procedures with which teachers and school _I 
boards-administrators work out their differences. D 
5. . . . the relationship between teachers and adminis- I 
trators. D 
6. . . . the relationship between teachers and admin- 1 
istrators. D 
7. . . . the principal's role as an instructional leader. I 
D 
8. . . . the satisfaction teachers, administrators, and I 
school boards derive from their respective roles. D 
9. . . . the quality of inservice training for teachers 1 
compared to what existed before teacher collec- D 
tive bargaining. 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has improved/ 
diminished : 
Circle One Check One (•) 
M o 
- b 
CO M 
]] 2 3 4 5 
10. . . . working conditions for teachers- I 
D 
11. . . . teacher-principal relationships. I 
D 
12. . , . the respect with which the general public I 
views teaching as a profession. D 
13. , . . public support for teachers' bargaining demands. I 
D 
14. . . . teacher evaluation procedures. I 
D 
15. . . . the quality of work done by teachers. I 
D 
16. . . . teacher job security. 1 
D 
17. . . . the role of teachers as the primary developers 1 
of school curriculum. D 
18. . . . the role of teachers as the primary change _! 
agents in the school's instructional program. D 
19. . . . student classroom behavior. I 
D 
20. . . . the impact teachers have on which and how 1 
many library books are purchased. D 
21. , . . the impact teachers have on the implementation 1 
of instructional programs which employ special D 
teachers. 
! 
22, . . . the impact teachers have on the selection of I 
textbooks for classroom use. D 
23. . . . the traditional lines of authority and the % 
flow of communication from teachers to the D 
board of education. 
24. . . . the impact teachers have on the amount and 1 
type of classroom materials purchased with D 
funds from the general budget. 
25. . . . the impact teachers have on determining which 1 
standardized tests are used to measure student D 
progress and how the results of these tests 
are used. 
26. . . - the scope of bargaining to include the school I 
calendar. D 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has improved/ 
diminished: 
Circle One Check One (•) 
4-1 00 
(30 § 
•H >_i 
r-H 4J 
w w 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 1 . . .  .  the quality of administration. 2 
D 
28. . . . the quality of boardsmanship. I 
D 
29. . . . the quality of education for dollars expended. I 
D 
30. . . . the quality of classroom instruction. I 
D 
31. . . . the development of improved school facilities. I 
D 
32. . . . salaries and fringes for teachers in nonbargain- I 
ing districts as a result of efforts by bar- D 
gaining units in surrounding districts. 
Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the Iowa 
Public Employment Relations Act, has increased/decreased: 
33. . . . the emphasis upon wages and working conditions I 
in netotiations between teachers and boards of D 
education. 
34. . . . the emphasis upon control of educational policy 1  
in negotiations between teachers and boards of D 
education. 
35. . . . the possibilities of teacher strikes in Iowa. I 
D 
36. . . . the number of disputes between teachers, ad- I 
ministrators, and boards as each of these D 
groups becomes more experienced with the process. 
37. . . . the number of quality people seeking positions I 
on boards of education. D 
38. . . . salaries for teachers. I 
D 
39. . . . fringe benefits for teachers, T 
D 
40. . . . the amount of input teachers have in the devel- I. 
opment of the school budget. D 
41. . . . the number of quality people seeking a career 
in teaching. D 
42. . . . the number of annual teacher terminations. % 
D 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has increased/ 
decreased : 
Circle One Check One (v) 
M G 
CO CO 
i z t+ 
43. • . . the development of new leadership styles by I 
administrators. D 
44. . . . the number of teachers who view the Iowa State I 
Education Association (ISEA) more as a profes- D 
sional association than a labor union. 
45. . . . the number of college graduates who want to 
enter teaching. D 
46. . . . the number of quality people seeking a career _! 
in school administration. D 
47. . . . the voice teachers have in determining which I 
teacher applicants are hired by a particular D 
school district. 
48. . . . the number of administrators who view the Iowa  ^
State Education Association (ISEA) more as a D 
professional association than a labor union. 
49. . . . the likelihood that teacher bargaining units  ^
and boards of education will avoid impasse on D 
negotiable items as they have gained experience 
in the negotiating process. 
50. . . . the esteem held by the public, for education I 
in general. D 
51. . . . the use of professional negotiators by teacher I 
bargaining units. D 1 
52. . . . the funds expended by teacher bargaining units _I 
to finance the bargaining process. D 
53. . . . the funds expended by boards of education to I 
finance the bargaining process. D 
54. . . . the number of years a superintendent remains in I 
a particular school district. D 
55. . - . the number of years board members serve on 1 
boards of education. D 
56. . . . the number of board members who view the Iowa I 
State Education Association (ISEA) more as a D 
professional association than a labor union. 
57. . . . the number of independent policy decisions I 
made by boards of education. D 
58. . . . the amount of input teachers have in the selec- I 
tion of their building principal. D 
59. . . . the use of professional negotiators by boards I 
of education. D 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has increased/ 
decreased: 
Circle One Check One M 
x: 
60 
•H 
CO 
1 2 3 4 5 
60. . . . the teachers* interest and involvement in I 
local school board elections. D 
61. . . . the amount of noncertified teacher aide help I 
provided teachers. D 
62. . . . the public's view of the Iowa State Education 1 
Association (ISEA) more as a professional asso- D 
ciation than a labor union. 
63. . . . the number of schools which have designated I 
daily working hours for teachers. D 
64. . . . supplemental pay for teachers for required hours I 
spent beyond the terms of the contract as the D 
request of administrators. 
65. . . . class sizes. I 
D 
66. . . . political involvement by the Iowa Association I 
of School Boards (lASB) D 
67. . . . the percentage of the school budget being I 
spent for teachers' salaries. D 
68. . . . political involvement by the Iowa Association J 
of School Administrators (Superintendents' D 
Association). 
69. . . . the number of superintendents who view binding 1 
arbitration as a more satisfactory means of D 
solving differences than teacher strike. 
1 
70. . . . school districts' general fund carry-over j[ 
balances and contingency funds. D 
71. , . . the chances of success in passing school bond I 
elections. D 
72. . . . efforts toward reorganization between Iowa 1 
school districts. D 
73. . . . political involvement by the Iowa State Educa- I 
tion Association (ISEA). D 
74. . . : the nijmber of teachers who view binding arbitra- 1 
tion as a more satisfactory means of solving D 
differences than teacher strike. 
75. . . - the demands by noncertified school personnel to 1 
bargain collectively with boards of education D 
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Teacher collective bargaining, as prescribed by the 
Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, has increased/ 
decreased : 
Circle One Check One ( ) 
76. . . . the number of years teachers remain in a I 
particular school district. D 
1 1 . . .  .  the number of board members who view binding I 
arbitration as a more satisfactory means of D 
solving differences than teacher strike. 
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IOWA STATE 
College of Education 
Professional Studies 
N243 Quadrangle 
Ames, Iowa 50011 
UNIVERSITY Telephone 515-294-4143 
Dear Superintendent: 
Enclosed you will find eight envelopes containing a questionnaire which is 
part of a research project being conducted at Iowa State University. The 
questionnaire in each envelope is identical to those in the other envelopes. 
Your assistance is sought in distributing the envelopes to the teachers and 
board member specified. The remaining questionnaire is to be completed by 
you. The cover letter accompanying each questionnaire asks that the com­
pleted questionnaire be sealed in the envelope provided and returned to you 
for mailing in the self-addressed stamped envelope. 
It has been seven years since implementation of the Public Employment Relations 
Act in Iowa. Ample time has passed to assess the outcomes of teacher col­
lective bargaining. Without a doubt, teacher collective bargaining has had 
an impact on the instructional and non-instructional facets of public educa­
tion in the first seven years under the law. Determining the extent of that 
impact on education may provide insight for new direction in the bargaining 
process. 
The enclosed questionnaire has been reviewed and approved by the leadership 
of the Iowa Association of School Boards, Iowa Association of School Admini­
strators, and the Iowa State Education Association. Member associations will 
Your individual identity and that of your school will be used to monitor the 
return of questionnaires but will not be identifiable in the analyses and 
reporting of data. All data collected will be studied as group data. 
As to the questionnaire, we believe you will find the instructions quite clear 
and understandable. Furthermore, your time involvement should be minimal. 
If you should have specific questions, please feel free to write to Dave Else, 
Hoi stein, Iowa, or call 1-712-368-4819. Finally, we wish to express our 
sincere appreciation to you for completing the questionnaire. 
receive copies of the findings in this study 
Sincerely 
Mr. Dave Else 
Researcher 
Dr. Ross A. Engel, Prof. 
Educational Administration 
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College of Education 
Professional Studies 
IOWA STATE 
LINIIVERSITY Telephone 515-294-4143 
Dear Colleagues: 
As part of a research project at Iowa State University, an attempt is 
being made to determine the instructional and non-instructional outcomes of 
teacher collective bargaining as perceived by Iowa teachers, superintendents, 
and board members. 
it has been seven years since implementation of the Iowa Public Employment 
Relations Act. Ample time to assess the outcomes of teacher collective 
bargaining has elapsed. Research completed in other states indicates teacher 
collective bargaining has had an impact on the instructional and non-instruc­
tional facets of public education. Determining the extent of the impact on 
education in Iowa may provide insight for new direction in the bargaining 
process. If bargaining parties gain a clearer understanding of the impact 
of collective bargaining from this study, new approaches may be taken In 
public employee negotiations. Won't you please help? 
In return for your assistance, we will send a summary of our conclusions 
and recommendations to the executive secretary of your state association. 
In order to collect the necessary data for this project, the enclosed 
questionnaire was developed and field-tested. You are now being asked to 
participate in this study by completing the survey, sealing it in the enve-
• OlIU I L L W y KJKJ I I I I L CI ISUCI I L » * IC/ V I IC tCCUIII 
the sealed questionnaires of other participants in your school in a 
self-addressed packet. 
Your responses will remain anonymous and all data will be studied as group 
data. 
Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Dave Else Ross Engel, Prof. 
Researcher Educational Administration 
IPSE 
148 
IOWA ASSOCIATiON OF SCHOOL BOARDS 
707 SAVINGS & LOAN BUtlDiNG 
ôtn AVENUE AT MULBERRY 
DcS MOINES. OWA 5030O 
TELEPHONE: 515-288-1991 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS February 12, 1982 
PRESIDENT 
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-REASuRER 
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Roife 50581 
-c-piC'i 
.ecs'cjn 
Rovre2 
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George Richards 
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Mr. David Else 
805 Kastner Drive 
Holstein, Iowa, 51025 
Hello Dave: 
Thank you very much for sharing with me your proposed dis­
sertation/thesis outline to study the attitudes of teachers, 
superintendents and board members in Iowa seven years after 
the enactment of the public employee collective bargaining 
law. It seems to me that this is a comprehensive study, the 
results of which should be beneficial to all of us who are 
engaged in the collective bargaining process, 
I understand in conducting the study, a questionnaire will 
be sent to the superintendents and board members in bargain­
ing and non-bargaining school districts throughout the state. 
I recognize the importance to the validity of your study to 
receive a high percentage of response from these individuals. 
I believe this study will yield useful information and would 
encourage those selected to participate to complete the 
questionnaire and provide the information requested. 
Good luck in your study. 
Sincerely, 
T. E, Davidson 
Executive Director 
TED/eg 
"Iowa's Educational Statesmen" 
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IOWA ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
900 Des Moines Street U ZO • Des Moines. Iowa 50316 
Telephone (515) 266-1582 
February 15, 1982 
OFFICERS 
James Robinson 
Presi iJenl  
Cedar Falls 
Merrlt Parsons 
Presidenl-Elect  
Pleasant Valley 
William Lepley 
Treasurer 
Atlan:ic 
Lyle Kehm 
Execut ive Secretary 
Des Moines 
EXECUTIVE BOARD 
Wayne Drexler 
Western Dubuque 
Peiry Uhl 
Northwood-Kensett 
Joseph Grail 
Spencer 
Rod Wilbeck 
Maurice-Orange City 
Byron Hotmelster 
Clarion 
Richard Ploeger 
AEA 6. Marshalltown 
Winston Addis 
Mount Verncr. 
Jamei Billings 
Ballard 
MZl Grell 
Sioux City 
Paul Crumley 
Creston 
J. Ira Rytn 
Eddyviile 
Richard Goodwin 
Mount Pleasant 
TO SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS 
For his Ph.D. dissertation Galva-Holstein 
Superintendent Dave Else is studying the 
perceptions of superintendents, board mem­
bers, and teachers on the instructional 
and non-instructional outcomes of the bar­
gaining law. 
The results promise to be interesting, and 
lASA hopes to summarize the high points for 
its members after Mr. Else has completed 
his study. 
The survey instrument is being mailed to a 
sampling of superintendents. lASA urges 
that you complete and return your question­
naire to Mr. Else promptly. 
Sincerely, 
Lyle Kehm 
Executive Secretary 
Richard Hansen 
Keystone AEA. Elkader 
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APPENDIX C: FOLLOW-UP LETTER 
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IOWA STATE 
College of Education 
Professional Studies 
N243 Quadrangle 
Ames, k)wa 50011 
UNIVERSITY Telephone 515-294-4143 
April 28,1982 
Dear Superintendent: 
About three weeks ago you received a packet of eight envelopes each containing 
a "Collective Bargaining Survey" like those enclosed. You probably have had 
some of the surveys returned. If you have a few participants who have not 
returned the survey, please have them fill out the original questionnaire or 
one of the duplicates enclosed and return it to you immediately. 
Because of the small number of people being asked to participate in this 
study, it is very important that each person respond. Please encourage those 
who have not returned the questionnaire to do so as soon as possible. 
If you cannot retrieve all eight questionnaires within the next 3~^ days, please 
send those you have received in the self-addressed envelope which accompanied 
the original survey. 
Thank you again for the assistance you have provided. 
Sincerely 
Ross A. Engel. Prof. 
Education Administration 
Dave Else 
" Researcher 
Enc. 
cc 
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ACTUAL 0UTCC8ME STATEMENTS CATEGORIZED BY SCALES 
SCALE: Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public 
Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
1. 
2 .  
4. 
5. 
6 .  
11. 
23. 
27. 
28.  
35. 
36. 
44. 
49. 
teacher-administrator-board relationships. 
the way in which teachers and school boards-administra­
tors work on matters of mutual concern. 
the procedures with which teachers and school boards-
administrators work out their differences. 
the relationship between teachers and administrators. 
the relationship between teachers and board members. 
teacher-principal relationships. 
the traditional lines of authority and the flow of 
communication from teachers to the board of education 
the quality of administration. 
the quality boardsmanship. 
the possibilities of teacher strikes in Iowa, 
the number of disputes between teachers, administra­
tors, and boards as each of these groups becomes more 
experienced with the process. 
the number of teachers who view the Iowa State Education 
Association (ISEA) more as a professional association than 
a labor union. 
the number of administrators who view the Iowa State Edu­
cation Association (ISEA) more as a professional associa­
tion than a labor union. 
the likelihood that teacher bargaining units and boards 
of education will avoid impasse on negotiable items as 
they have gained experience in the negotiating process. 
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51. . . . the use of professional negotiators by teacher bargain­
ing units. 
52. ... the funds expended by teacher bargaining units to finance 
the bargaining process. 
53. ... the funds expended by boards of education to finance the 
bargaining process. 
56. ... the number of board members who view the Iowa State 
Education Association (ISEA) more as a professional 
association than a labor union. 
59. ... the use of professional negotiators by boards of educa­
tion. 
69. ... the number of superintendents who view binding arbitration 
as a more satisfactory means of solving differences than 
teacher strike. 
74. ... the number of teachers who view binding arbitration as 
a more satisfactory means of solving differences than 
teacher strike. 
77. ... the number of board members who view binding arbitration 
as a more satisfactory means of solving differences than 
teacher strike. 
SCALE : Board Power 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act has improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
3. ... the school board's right to determine education 
policies. 
33. ... the emphasis upon wages and working conditions in negotia­
tions between teachers and boards of education. 
34. ... the emphasis upon control of educational policy in negotia­
tions between teachers and boards of education. 
57. ... the number of independent policy decisions made by boards 
of education. 
75. ... the demands by noncertified school personnel to bargain 
collectively with boards of education. 
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SCALE; Job Satisfaction 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS; 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
8. ... the satisfaction teachers, administrators, and school 
boards derive from their respective roles. 
37. . - . the number of quality people seeking positions on boards 
of education. 
41. ... the number of quality people seeking a career in 
teaching. 
45. ... the number of college graduates who want to enter 
teaching. 
46. ... the number of quality people seeking a career in school 
administration. 
54. ... the number of years a superintendent remains in a 
particular school district. 
55. ... the number of years board members serve on boards of 
education. 
76. ... the number of years teachers remain in a particular 
school district. 
SCALE: Salaries-Fringes 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
32. ... salaries and fringes for teachers in nonbargainitig dis­
tricts as a result of efforts by bargaining units in 
surroundxng dzstrzcts. 
38. ... salaries for teachers. 
39. ... fringe benefits for teachers. 
42. ... the number of annual teacher terminations. 
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67. ... the percentage of school budget being spent for 
teachers' salaries. 
SCALE: Instruction 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, had improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
7. 
9. 
15. 
19. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
61. 
65. 
the principal's role as an instructional leader. 
the quality of inservice training for teachers compared 
to what existed before teacher collective bargaining. 
the quality of work done by teachers. 
student classroom behavior. 
the quality of education for dollars expended. 
the quality of classroom instruction. 
the development of improved school facilities-
the amount of noncertified teacher aide help provided 
teachers. 
class sizes. 
SCALE: Teacher Input 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
17. ... the role of teachers as the primary developers of 
school curriculum. 
18. ... the role of teachers as the primary change agents in the 
school's instructional program. 
20. ... the impact teachers have on which and how many library 
books are purchased. 
21. ... the impact teachers have on the implementation of instruc­
tional programs which employ special teachers. 
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22. ... the impact teachers have on the selection of textbooks 
for classroom use. 
24. ... the impact teachers have on the amount and type of class­
room materials purchased with funds from the general 
budget. 
25. ... the impact teachers have on determining which standard­
ized tests are used to measure students' progress and 
how the results of these tests are used. 
40. ... the amount of input teachers have in the development of 
the school budget. 
47. ... the voice teachers have in determining which teacher 
applicants are hired by a particular school district. 
58. ... the amount of input teachers have in the selection of 
their building principal. 
SCALE : Public Opinion 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased); 
12. ... the respect with which the general public views teaching 
as a profession. 
13. ... public support for teachers' bargaining demands. 
50. ... the esteem held by the public, for education in general, 
62. ... the public's view of the Iowa State Education Association 
(ISEA) more as a professional association than a labor 
union. 
71- ... the chances of success in passing school bond elections. 
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SCALE; Working Conditions 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased); 
10. 
14. 
16. 
26.  
43. 
63. 
64. 
working conditions for teachers. 
teacher evaluation procedures. 
teacher job security. 
the scope of bargaining to include the school calendar. 
the development of new leadership styles by administrators. 
the number of schools which have designated daily working 
hours for teachers. 
supplemental pay for teachers for required hours spent 
beyond the terms of the contract at the request of 
administrators. 
SCALE : Budget 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act has, improved/diminished (increased/decreased): 
70. . . . school districts" general fund carry-over balances and 
contingency funds. 
72. ... efforts toward reorganization between Iowa school districts. 
SCALE: Political Involvement 
ACTUAL OUTCOME STATEMENTS: 
Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Em­
ployment Relations Act, has improved/diminished (increased/decreased) 
60. ... teachers' interest and involvement in local school 
board elections. 
66. ... political involvement by the Iowa Association of School 
Boards (lASB). 
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68. ... political involvement by the Icwa Association of School 
Administrators (Superintendents' Association). 
73. ... political involvement by the Iowa State Education 
Association (ISEA). 
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APPENDIX E; PARENT AND NONPARENT TABLES 
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Table 21. Tests for significant differences between Iowa teachers 
relative to whether they are parents or nonparents with 
respect to the actual instructional and noninstructional 
outcome mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Iowa 
Pa rent 
(n=120) 
teachers 
Nonparent 
(n=89) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.54 6.71 1.35 
Board power 7.18 7.33 0.92 
Job satisfaction 5.91 6.22 3.38 
Salaries-fringes 7.55 7.65 0.27 
Instruction 6.51 6.64 0.83 
Teacher input 6.28 6.33 0.14 
Public opinion 5.03 5.56 4.84* 
Working conditions 7.74 7.66 0.19 
Budget 6.23 6.43 0.94 
Political involvement 8.40 7.97 4.66* 
• k  
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 22. Tests for significant differences between Iowa board members 
relative to whether they are parents or nonparents with re­
spect to the actual instructional and noninstructional out­
come mean scores on the ten scales 
Scales 
Iowa board members 
Parent Nonparent 
(n=45) (n=l) 
F 
ratio 
Teacher/superintendent/ 
board relations 6.08  6.00 0.01 
Board power 
Job satisfaction 
Salary-fringes 
6.63 
5.04 
7.14 
6.40 
5.38 
7.80 
0.03 
0.06 
0.22 
Instruction 5.41 6.33 0.33 
Teacher input 
Public opinion 
5.86 
3.58 
6.70 
3.40 
0.48 
0.01 
Working conditions 7.20 6.57 0.24 
Budget 4.77 5.50 0.19 
Political involvement 8.44 8.00 0 .8  
